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Summary
This thesis covers the analysis of current UK economic issues relating to
immigration and the labour market. In particular, since the late 1990s, the UK
has experienced increasing immigration inﬂows signiﬁcantly aﬀecting both the
economy and society as a whole. In parallel, over the last two decades the country
has undergone other substantial changes in the structure of the labour market,
primarily due to an intrinsic rapid educational upgrading and the pervasive eﬀect
of technological change.
Chapter 1 studies immigrant assimilation by comparing the life satisfaction of
immigrants across diﬀerent generations against that of their native peers. The
immigrant generations appear less satisﬁed with their lives than the native
population. However, a number of individual and neighbourhood-level ethnic
and socio-economic characteristics explain the observed gaps, with the exception
of the 2.5 immigrant generation. Finally, assimilation is achieved with the
third immigrant generation. This analysis oﬀers interesting insights with respect
to policy. In particular, the lower well-being of immigrant children appears
relevantly aﬀected by objective livelihood conditions, such as residential area or
neighbourhood deprivation, and therefore can be more easily addressed by policies.
Chapter 2 develops a model to explain the channels through which heterogeneous
ﬁrms may adjust their product and process innovation activities in response to
local labour supply shocks. The model is empirically tested using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence methodology, exploiting the large low-skilled immigration inﬂow
induced by the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. No signiﬁcant
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treatment eﬀect is found on process innovation, while a negative and signiﬁcant
average treatment eﬀect is detected on product innovation. This is rationalised
within the theoretical framework as an incentive for ﬁrms to substitute away from
a high-skill activity that is now relatively more expensive. However, a number of
empirical limits in the analysis advocate for future work.
Chapter 3 estimates the causal eﬀect of technological exposure on UK local
labour markets while providing suggestive evidence on the role of changes in the
composition of the labour force. The instrumental variables strategy exploits local
variation in the historical specialization in routine-intensive activities. Technology
appears to displace middle routine workers and push them to lower-skilled jobs.
However, no signiﬁcant eﬀect of technological exposure is found on skilled non-
routine cognitive employment. At the same time, a negative association is found
with the start-of-the-period local relative graduate labour supply during the
1990s. This last result is reinforced by evidence of an accentuated occupational
downgrading since the 1990s. The disruptive technological change and the
intensifying job competition caused by educational upgrading highlight the
fundamental need for policy-makers to focus on sustaining employment and
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Chapter 1
Life Satisfaction Assimilation of Immigrants in the UK
Abstract
Using data from the ﬁrst wave of the Understanding Society Survey (2009-2010), this
paper provides ﬁrst empirical evidence on the life satisfaction assimilation of immigrants
in the UK. The life satisfaction of immigrants across diﬀerent generations is compared
against that of their native peers. First results conﬁrm that life satisfaction appears
U-shaped in the immigrant generation. A number of socio-demographic individual
and neighbourhood-level characteristics help explain the life satisfaction gaps. When
ethnic characteristics are taken into account, the association between ﬁrst and second
immigrant generations and life satisfaction halves. Conditioning on home-ownership,
ﬁrst generation immigrants with less than 10 years since migration seem not to diﬀer
with respect to natives. When conditioning on neighbourhood deprivation, on the one
hand, being a second generation immigrant does not aﬀect the probability of being
at least somewhat satisﬁed or higher. On the other hand, it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the
probability for second generation immigrants of being mostly satisﬁed or higher, but
not so for those living outside the London area. The life satisfaction gap suﬀered by
generation 2.5 remains an unsolved puzzle1.
Key Words: Subjective well-being, Life satisfaction, Immigration, Neighbourhood
JEL Codes: I31, J15, R23
1Data from the Understanding Society Survey have been made available by the Institute
for Social and Economic Research (ISER) through the UK Data Archive under special licence.
Neither ISER nor the UK Data Archive bear any responsibility for the analysis or interpretation
of the data reported here.
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1.1 Introduction
In recent years increasing emphasis has been placed on the role of policy makers in the
promotion of individuals' well-being. Economic outcomes, though important measures,
have been widely recognized not to be able alone to capture individuals' quality of life
[Graham, 2009, 2011]. As a result, governments have been developing national accounts
of well being. In 2009 the European Union launched Well-being 2030, a research project
for the development of policy guidelines to provide European citizens with a higher
quality of life within 2030. In 2010 David Cameron announced the National Well-Being
Project for the UK, with the aim of measuring national progress in a more complete
way. Also, national and European longitudinal surveys have introduced relevant ques-
tions to explore individuals' well-being domains, examples are the British Household
Panel Survery (BHPS), the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and the European
Social Survey (ESS).
The measurement of well-being is indeed important also with respect to immigrant com-
munities settled in the receiving society. As a matter of fact, immigration is undertaken
in pursuit of a better life. However, the settlement into a new country evolves into a long
and complex process of adaptation, or so called, assimilation. Britain, along with France
and other countries worldwide, has recently experienced hot public and policy debates
about ethnic diversity, community cohesion, and immigration. Low levels of well-being if
not addressed may ultimately lead to social breakdowns, such as the riots that spread in
England in 2001 and 2011. Young [2003] highlights that these social disturbances were
caused by immigrant children who expected equal economic and social opportunities
with respect to the other members of the society but suﬀered marginalization instead.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper provides ﬁrst empirical evidence on the life sat-
isfaction assimilation across immigrant generations in the UK during the period 2009-
2010. The life satisfaction of immigrants is compared against that of natives, while
accounting for a wide set of socio-demographic factors. While the variables of interest
are exogenous, many relationships between the dependent and the conditioning variables
are simultaneous. Therefore, the model estimates will not be interpreted as causal eﬀects
but rather as associations. Furthermore, unobserved personal traits are likely to cause
omitted variable bias.
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Results conﬁrm that life satisfaction is U-shaped over the immigrant generations, reach-
ing its minimum with the second generation. Individual socio-economic characteristics
partly explain the gap. When ethnic characteristics are taken into account, the as-
sociation between immigrant generation and life satisfaction halves. Conditioning on
home-ownership, generation 1 immigrants with less than 10 years since migration seem
not to diﬀer with respect to natives. Generation 2 and 2.5 show instead a persistent
lower life satisfaction with respect to natives.
In the second part of the analysis the focus is restricted on the life satisfaction gaps
suﬀered by the middle immigrant generations and the role of neighbourhood cultural
deprivation characterstics is investigated. Final estimates suggest that conditioning on
neighbourhood deprivation, being a generation 2 immigrant has a negative signiﬁcant
association with the probability to be mostly satisﬁed or higher, but not so for individu-
als living outside the London area. Also, ceteris paribus, being a generation 2 immigrant
has no signiﬁcant association with the probability to be at least somewhat satisﬁed or
higher.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the relevant
theoretical perspectives on immigrant assimilation and subjecting well-being. Section
1.3 reviews the related empirical studies. Section 1.4 presents the data sources and sum-
mary descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 describes the empirical methodology. Section 1.6
discusses the analysis results. Section 1.7 tests the robustness of estimates and section
1.8 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Perspectives: Theories of Immi-
grant Assimilation and Subjective Well-being
When we think about individuals' life satisfaction, we are induced to expect that the
longer the period since migration and the further the generation, the more individuals
will improve their living conditions and proceed with the assimilation path. As time
goes by, immigrants should report a higher level of satisfaction.
However, a number of considerations emerging from the theories on subjective well-being
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and assimiliation should be taken into account.
Studies on subjective well-being show that people, when developing opinions and
evaluations about life circumstances, engage in internal and external social comparison
[Bartram, 2010; Clark et al., 2008; Festinger, 1954]. Individuals' responses will depend
on the comparison of own achievements with respect to personal aspirations (internal
comparison) as well as with respect to the relevant social group (external comparison).
The former is even more signiﬁcant for ﬁrst generation immigrants. They will in
fact assign a special weight to the fulﬁlment of aspirations as these have importantly
contributed to the decision to migrate. As regards the latter, there are two possible
reference groups for immigrants: people who remain in the sending country and their
native peers in the host society. First generation immigrants are in touch with two
diﬀerent worlds, the sending country that they left behind and the receiving country
where they settle in pursuit of a better life. The general expectation is that in the early
period after migration people compare themselves to the former, while as time passes,
the new relevant group for comparison becomes the latter. Immigrants' children will
instead be more likely to compare only to their native peers.
Bartram [2010] argues that when comparing to people left in the sending country,
immigrants may experience satisfaction as they generally improve their living conditions
by settling in a wealthier country. When comparing with others in the host country,
immigrants are instead more likely to show dissatisfaction due to the diﬃculties in
achieving upward mobility.
The Chicago School of Sociology in the early 20th century was the ﬁrst to provide a
theory of immigrant assimilation, by analysing the process of inclusion of European
immigrants in the American society. This theory took the name of straight-line
assimilation theory as these immigrant groups were found to become increasingly more
similar in characteristics, values and behaviour to natives over time.
Since then, diﬀerent ethnic groups of immigrants have established in the USA in very
large numbers and the assimilation of immigrants has been subject to large debate.
Among the diﬀerent reformulations, the theory of segmented assimilation of Portes
and Zhou [1993] gained major popularity. By observing the new second generation
descending from Latin-American and Asian immigrants, this theory argues that
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assimilation may not necessarily be the end result and opens up to a multiplicity of
outcomes for second generation immigrants.
Alba and Nee [1997, 2003] reformulated assimilation theory once again. They ﬁnd
inconclusive many of the diﬀerences between the European immigrants and the new
immigrants previously claimed. They argue that, although unevenly and in diﬀerent
ways, assimilation is taking place. Moreover, they make the important point that in
many cases the children of the European immigrant groups did not fully assimilate until
the third or fourth generation.
Therefore, a critical point that emerges from these theories is that assimilation may be
achieved in diﬀerent ways and with diﬀerent timing so that it may require a number of
generations to fully take place.
1.3 Literature Review
A wide economic literature is dedicated to the study of the assimilation of immigrants.
One part of the research work has focused on the economic assimilation as compared to
their native peers on the basis of immigrant-native wage gap [e.g. Borjas, 1995; Chiswick,
1978], immigrants' occupational mobility [e.g. Chiswick et al., 2005; Chiswick and Miller,
2009], education and economic performance [e.g. Algan et al., 2010; Chiswick and Miller,
2011; Dustmann, Frattini and Theodoropoulos, 2010], language and earnings [e.g., Dust-
mann and Fabbri, 2003; Leslie and Lindley, 2001; Lindley, 2002]. Another side of the
literature has explored the cultural and social assimilation of immigrants, looking at
fertility rates [e.g., Riphan and Mayer, 2000], religion [e.g. Bisin et al., 2008; Bisin and
Verdier, 2000], residential segregation [e.g. Musterd et al., 2008] or time-use [e.g. Zaiceva
and Zimmermann, 2007]. De Palo et al. [2007] focus on the social assimilation of immi-
grants. [Aleksynska and Algan, 2010] undertake a comprehensive analysis of immigrant
assimilation along economic, cultural and civic outcomes in Europe. As the latter point
out, immigrant adaptation into the settlement country is a very complex process and the
empirical evidence shows that assimilation may occur along only some of its dimensions.
Importantly, they also highlight that the heterogeneity among immigrants in diﬀerent
countries plays an important role in explaining assimilation patterns, so that more re-
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search is needed at a regional and ethnical level. A few works have analysed assimilation
through subjective measures such as feelings of national identity [e.g. Dustmann, 1996;
Manning and Roy, 2010].
As regards happiness and life-satisfaction measures, economists have shown a long-
standing scepticism. Nevertheless, during the last decade, subjective well-being has
started to gain the attention of the economic literature, with most research focusing on
the relation between happiness and income.
Only a few studies, mainly in the sociology literature, have addressed the life satisfaction
of immigrants in the destination country. In this respect, there are two main ﬁndings.
Firstly, immigrants and their oﬀspring typically show lower life satisfaction with respect
to their native counterparts. Secondly, diﬀerent immigrant groups, from diﬀerent coun-
tries or ethnicity, may experience considerably diﬀerent levels of well-being.
B lµ tescu [2005] uses the ﬁrst wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2002) to
provide a ﬁrst attempt of comparative analysis of the well-being levels between immi-
grants and their native peers in thirteen European countries in terms of life satisfaction,
happiness and satisfaction with societal domains. The work suggests that immigrants
experience a lower well-being with respect to natives in almost all the countries in the
sample. However, immigrants show on average a signiﬁcantly higher satisfaction with
the socio-economic environment in the settlement country with respect to natives. The
author interprets these two pieces of evidence as a result of the diﬀerent groups against
which immigrants compare in the diﬀerent domains. When judging overall life satisfac-
tion, immigrants relate themselves to natives, and this leads to lower reported scores.
Immigrants feel instead more satisﬁed than natives with the social environment poten-
tially because in this domain they relate themselves to their peers in the country of
origin.
B lµ tescu [2007] expands the analysis to the ﬁrst and second rounds of ESS (2002,
2004) and measures the well-being of Eastern European immigrants with respect to na-
tives in the country of settlement. This research conﬁrms B lµ tescu [2005]'s ﬁndings
and highlights a further result, i.e. Eastern European immigrants show lower well-being
levels than Western immigrants.
Saﬁ [2010] analyses the ﬁrst three rounds of ESS (2002, 2004, 2006). Lower levels of
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life satisfaction are found for ﬁrst, second and 2.5 generation immigrants in comparison
to natives with no foreign born parent. In particular, the second generation shows a
substantial worse-oﬀ position with respect to the ﬁrst. The author focuses on under-
standing the determinants of the lower well-being of this generation. The signiﬁcant
degree of perceived discrimination experienced by second generation ethnic minorities is
concluded to be a plausible explanation.
Kirmano§lu and Ba³levent [2013] analyse the ﬁfth ESS wave and explore the life satis-
faction of individuals, focusing on the eﬀect of ethnic minority membership and its in-
teraction with immigration, discrimination and citizenship. Results suggest that second
generation immigrants present higher life satisfaction than ﬁrst generation immigrants,
narrowing the life satisfaction gap with respect to natives. However, a deeper analy-
sis seems to suggest that the assimilation hypothesis applies only to second generation
immigrants not identifying themselves as ethnic minority members. Citizenship seems
instead less important in the context of life satisfaction.
Koczan [2012] uses longitudinal panel data from GSOEP covering the period 1984-2010
and investigates two questions: whether ﬁrst generation immigrants are worse-oﬀ with
respect to natives in terms of well-being and what determines the life satisfaction of
immigrants. The author uses a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation to remove any time-invariant un-
observable characteristics such as personality traits although this leads the regression
model to drop the generation dummies of interest. Lags are used to address reverse
causality. Results indicate that immigrants show lower satisfaction than natives when
controlling for education and employment, but this eﬀect disappears when taking into
account whether the individual works in the occupation he/she was trained for. As re-
gards the determinants of immigrants' life satisfaction, in contrast with previous studies,
feelings of belonging is not a signiﬁcant predictor, and citizenship seems to have more
a self-selection eﬀect rather than a causal eﬀect on life satisfaction. Also, residential
segregation does not seem relevant when including ﬁxed-eﬀects.
These few studies provide some insights into the well-being of immigrants in the settle-
ment country, although little evidence still exists on the analysis of life satisfaction of
immigrant generations beyond the ﬁrst.
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1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
I use data from the ﬁrst wave of Understanding Society (US) (2009-2010), a major house-
hold panel survey in Great Britain. The dataset covers around 30,000 UK households
and contains a large variety of information on social and economic aspects of individ-
uals' lives. Moreover, it represents an extremely valuable data source for immigration
and ethnicity related research purposes. The dataset includes an ethnic minority boost
sample of about 1000 individuals from each of the major ethnic groups residing in Great
Britain, i.e., Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Caribbean and African, selected in areas
where the estimated density of ethnic minorities exceeded 5%. The adult self-completion
questionnaire contains some questions on the subjective well-being of individuals. The
outcome variable of interest derives from the following question: How are you satisﬁed
with your life overall? The respondents have to tick one out of seven outcomes, ranging
from completely dissatisﬁed, mostly dissatisﬁed, somewhat dissatisﬁed, neither satisﬁed
nor dissatisﬁed, mostly satisﬁed and completely satisﬁed.
This paper investigates the eﬀect of immigrants' own generations on their life satisfac-
tion relative to the native population. Immigrant generations are identiﬁed through
information on the country of birth of the respondent, and of his or her parents and
grandparents, as well as on the respondent's age at arrival in the UK. While the clas-
siﬁcation of migrant generations is generally deﬁned by country of birth, age at arrival
is also to be considered important. The threshold used here to distinguish between ﬁrst
and second generations is age 5, corresponding to the age at which pupils start with
primary school in the UK. Individuals born abroad but raised in the UK are expected
to be more similar to UK-born individuals than to people born and raised abroad. Nev-
ertheless, the main results do not change if generations are deﬁned by country of birth
only. According to these criteria, ﬁrst generation immigrants are individuals living in
the UK but who were born abroad and who arrived to the country after 5 years of
age. The second immigrant generation is composed of either individuals who were born
abroad but that migrated to the UK before 5 years of age or UK-born children with
both parents born abroad. The 2.5 immigrant generation includes UK-born children or
foreign born children with arrival age before 5 and with only one parent born outside the
UK. Finally, the third immigrant generation regards UK-born children of two UK born
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parents, with at least one foreign-born grandparent. Natives are UK-born individuals
with UK-born parents and grandparents.
The analysis restricts to those individuals aged 16 and over, therefore eligible to com-
plete the adult self-completion questionnaire. 6301 individuals are excluded due to not
enough available information to disentangle whether they belonged to a speciﬁc immi-
grant generation or to the native group. In total, the sample of analysis consists of about
47,000 individuals, interviewed between January 2009 and December 2010.
Figure 1.1 shows that the distribution of life satisfaction responses is skewed to the left.
The mean value is 5,25 while the mode and median value is 6. Table 1.1 shows a sum-
mary of the main descriptive statistics for the diﬀerent sample groups in 2009-2010. It
can be observed that the immigrant generations show lower life satisfaction levels with
respect to natives. The life satisfaction means of the immigrant groups increase towards
that of natives the further the generation, with the exception of a drop coinciding with
the second generation. This conﬁrms the U-shape of life satisfaction over the immigrant
generations found in Saﬁ [2010].
Importantly, the ﬁrst two generations distinguish themselves in a number of characteris-
tics. Generations 2.5 and 3 are instead relatively more similar to the native population.
The immigrant groups are relatively younger with respect to the native population, with
the second generation being the youngest showing a mean of 34 years of age.
The ﬁrst generation has the highest proportion of individuals with at least a ﬁrst degree
(44%) as opposite to the native group which shows the lowest percentage (30%). In
more detail, 60% of ﬁrst generation degree holders are immigrants with less than 10
years since migration.
First generation households present the lowest average net income (¿1160), followed by
native households (¿1268). At the same time, ﬁrst generation immigrants are the least
likely to own a house or a ﬂat at least partially (42%), while natives are the most likely
(72%).
The second generation presents the highest proportion of unemployed individuals (11%),
followed by the ﬁrst generation (9%) while the native population shows the lowest one
(5%).
The ﬁrst generation registers the highest proportion of individuals employed in low
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skilled jobs (26%). Generation 1 and 2 show signiﬁcantly higher household sizes with
respect to the other groups, even though generation 2 immigrants are the least likely to
be married or live as a couple.
As regards the ethnic background, the further the generation, the stronger the feeling
of belonging to the white British ethnicity. Notably, a big jump is registered with the
2.5 generation. Only 13% of second generation immigrants deﬁne themselves as white
British, while 73% of 2.5 generation does so.
Furthermore, the ﬁrst two generations show the highest proportions of individuals deﬁn-
ing themselves as belonging to a religion. The majority of individuals lives in England,
with the highest proportions in the ﬁrst two generations (95% and 97% respectively),
and the lowest in the native population (79%). Generation 1 and 2 individuals reside
predominantly in urban areas as well as in areas with higher concentration of ethnic
minorities with respect to the other groups.
1.5 Method
I analyse the life satisfaction of immigrants across diﬀerent generations, compared
against their native peers in the UK. The research purpose is to analyse the eﬀect
of immigrants' generations on their own life satisfaction, which is clearly unilateral.
However, many relationships between the dependent and the conditioning variables
will be simultaneous. Therefore, the model estimates will not be interpreted as causal
eﬀects but rather in terms of magnitude and sign of variables' associations. Although
unobserved personal traits are swept into the error term and cause omitted variable
bias, models such as ﬁxed eﬀects cannot be adopted because the variables of interest,
the generation dummies, would otherwise be lost. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to
expect that time-invariant personality traits, such as innate motivation, would bias the
estimates of the variables of interest to the same extent. In this sense, the comparability
of estimates between the generation variables would be preserved. Changes in the
magnitude/signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients as a result of selected control
variables will be interpreted as potential explanatory factors of the life satisfaction gaps.
Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, an ordered regression might be seen
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as the most suitable choice of model. However, given the negatively skewed distribution
of life satisfaction a binary choice model is the selected choice for the analysis. Moreover,
an ordered regression involves one major speciﬁcation issue in addition to those relevant
for binary regressions, i.e. the parallel regression assumption. This means that the eﬀect
of a regressor is assumed to be invariant across any split in the data.
I estimate the probability of being in the top two categories of the life satisfaction
distribution. I use a logit model where life satisfaction is reduced to a binary
variable, where a value of 1 jointly indicates the categories completely satisﬁed and
mostly satisﬁed whereas 0 comprehends all the lower categories. The consistency
of the estimated associations for the generation dummies' is tested applying diﬀerent
speciﬁcations and regression models. Standard errors are clustered at the household
level, assuming that the individuals' errors will be correlated to those of other household
members.
1.6 Results
In column (1) of Table 1.2 life satisfaction is regressed on the generation dummies and
basic socio-demographic individual characteristics, i.e., gender, age and its square, degree
or higher qualiﬁcation, long-standing illness or impairment, having a partner, belonging
to a religion, unemployment, net household income. All the regressors' estimates have
the expected signs and are in line with the general ﬁndings in the literature [for a de-
tailed literature review on subjective well-being see Dolan et al., 2008].
Males appear signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed than females. Age shows a U-shape relationship
with life satisfaction, with the minimum at around 40 years of age. Holding at least
a degree has a positive and signiﬁcant association with life satisfaction. Long-standing
illness or impairment has a strong negative coeﬃcient. Being married or in a couple has
a signiﬁcant positive association, while having at least one child seems instead to have
a signiﬁcant negative association. Belonging to a religion has a signiﬁcant positive rela-
tionship with overall life satisfaction. As expected, unemployment has instead a strong
negative coeﬃcient. Net household income is computed aggregating monthly net labour
income from the (self-) employed members of the family. Net household income shows
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a positive but small relationship with life satisfaction.
All the generation dummies exhibit signiﬁcant and negative coeﬃcients, conﬁrming that
the immigrant generations appear relatively less satisﬁed than natives. Speciﬁcally, 1,
2 and 2.5 generations have a strong signiﬁcant and negative association with life satis-
faction. In particular, generation 2 appears to be signiﬁcantly worse oﬀ with respect to
all the other immigrant generation groups when compared to natives. Third generation
immigrants also seem to signiﬁcantly diﬀer from natives in terms of life satisfaction but
to a much lesser extent than the other generations. With respect to generation 1, I
hypothesize that years since migration may play an important eﬀect on life satisfaction.
I argue that ﬁrst generation immigrants will be more comparable to the other generation
groups the longer the period since migration. In fact, ﬁrst generation immigrants are
in touch with two diﬀerent worlds: the sending country that they left behind and the
receiving country where they settle in pursuit of a better life. The general expectation is
that in the early period after migration people compare themselves to the former, while
as time passes, the new relevant group for comparison becomes the latter. Immigrants'
children will instead be more likely to compare only to their native peers.
In column (2) I introduce in the speciﬁcation the interaction between a dummy for
whether the individual has moved to the UK since more than 10 years and the ﬁrst
generation dummy. Interestingly, the estimated coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant.
This ﬁnding seems to suggest that the more the years since migration, the less the satis-
faction of ﬁrst generation immigrants. I investigate this association further. Figure 1.2
shows the frequency distribution of years since migration for ﬁrst generation immigrants.
I split ﬁrst generation immigrants into four subcategories by years since migration (10-
20, 20-30, 30-50, 50+) and include a dummy for each of them in column (3). What
seems to matter is the range 10 to 20 years since migration. Migrants belonging to
this cohort feel substantially less satisﬁed than newly arrived ones. Instead, there is no
statistical diﬀerence between new immigrants and immigrants that have been living
in the UK for more than 20 years. It is important to note that we cannot identify
whether this years since migration eﬀect that is observed is due to the fact that peo-
ple who are not satisﬁed ultimately leave and therefore a composition eﬀect or if there
is a genuine non-linear relationship between years since migration and life satisfaction
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for ﬁrst generation immigrants. Given the observed evidence I choose to use a dummy
for the category 10-20 and a dummy for the category 20+ years since migration in the
preferred speciﬁcation as shown in column (1) of table 1.3. In the next few columns I
progressively enrich the model to investigate other potential explanatory factors for the
life satisfaction gaps between immigrants and natives.
In column (2) ethnic characteristics are added. Importantly, when accounting for eth-
nicity, the generation 1 and 2 coeﬃcients reduce by about half of their magnitude. The
chosen baseline category for ethnicity is the Indian group, which has been the largest
non-white group present in Britain since census 1991 records. It can be observed that
non-white groups do not signiﬁcantly diﬀer in terms of life satisfaction with respect to
Indians. White British and other white ethnicities have instead signiﬁcant and posi-
tive coeﬃcients. Another factor which may signiﬁcantly aﬀect the life satisfaction gap of
immigrant generations is home ownership. In particular, generation 1 shows a very low
home ownership rate of 42%. The rate reduces to 21% if we take into account individuals
with less than 10 years since migration. The other generations show a home ownership
rate of 64-65% against a rate of 72% for natives.
Accordingly, in column (3) I ﬁnd a substantial signiﬁcant positive association for home
ownership. As a result, the generation 1 coeﬃcient reduces by 16 percentage points and
turns not signiﬁcant. First generation immigrants with less than 10 years since migration
do not appear less satisﬁed than natives. The interaction dummies between years since
migration and ﬁrst generation are instead signiﬁcantly negative. Independently of home
ownership ﬁrst generation immigrants with more than 10 years since migration appear
unhappier than more recent immigrants. When compared with respect to natives, the
omitted category, they also appear signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed, even though the gap has
decreased. No relevant change is registered for the other generation dummies.
In addition, I hypothesize that residential characteristics may be important explanatory
factors of immigrant generations' life satisfaction gaps.
Column (4) accounts for whether the individual lives in a constituent country other than
England, and whether the individual lives in an area (postal sector) with low density of
ethnic minorities (below 5%). Both variables have positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients.
They are positively correlated as England is the country with the highest concentra-
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tion of ethnic minorities. Column (5) additionally controls for urban rather than rural
residential area. The variable seems to capture the eﬀect of low density of ethnic mi-
nority areas, which reduces in magnitude and turns not signiﬁcant. These two variables
are negatively correlated as urban areas are more ethnically diverse than rural areas.
The generations' coeﬃcients do not relevantly change, neither do ethnicity coeﬃcients.
Broad residential characteristics seem to explain very little about immigrants' life sat-
isfaction gaps. Data at the neighbourhood level may shed more light on the impact of
local environment on the life satisfaction of immigrant generations.
Finally, I investigate the role of occupational background. The descriptive statistics
show that the employment of ﬁrst generation immigrants in partly skilled or unskilled
occupations is double as much as the other generations. The literature has documented
that immigrants and ethnic minorities may be more likely than UK-born individuals to
be overeducated with respect to the educational level common for the occupations in
which they are employed [Altorjai, 2013; Lindley, 2009]. As regards individuals' occupa-
tional background, dummies were included for each Registrar General's Social Class (SC)
of current job (i.e., professional, managerial and technical, skilled non-manual, skilled
manual, partly skilled and unskilled). Only professional and managerial occupations
appeared to have a signiﬁcant positive association with life satisfaction as compared to
unskilled occupations, while all the other dummies were jointly not signiﬁcant. Condi-
tioning on professional and managerial occupations in column (6) does not aﬀect the
main results.
Important key ﬁndings emerge from this analysis. All the immigrant generations show
lower life satisfaction levels than their native peers. First generation immigrants with
less than 10 years since migration do not longer seem less satisﬁed than natives once we
condition on home ownership. The main result born out by the data is a substantial
and negative signiﬁcant eﬀect of generations 2 and 2.5 on life satisfaction, which per-
sists after controlling for ethnicity, home-ownership, occupational background and broad
residential characteristics. The generation 3 coeﬃcient shows the smallest magnitude,
barely changing across the speciﬁcations but losing any statistical signiﬁcance as the
set of control variables widens. The emerging evidence is therefore that assimilation
seems to be achieved by the third immigrant generation. The next step in the analysis
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is to focus on the life satisfaction gap of the middle immigrant generations and take into
account neighbourhood-level cultural characteristics and deprivation.
1.6.1 Life Satisfaction and Neighbourhood Characteristics
Immigrant children most likely face a cultural conﬂict between their family background
and origins against the outside world where they live, study or work. I argue that
neighbourhood cultural and deprivation characteristics may explain the lower life
satisfaction experienced by these generations.
Beyond ethnicity, religious diﬀerences may also play a relevant role in explaining cultural
conﬂicts. In particular, Muslim immigrants diﬀer substantially from non-Muslims
groups. Muslims show stronger religious identity and seem to culturally integrate less
and more slowly than non-Muslims groups in the UK [Bisin et al., 2008]. Unfortunately,
variables registering religious aﬃliations contain many missing values which make such
analysis insigniﬁcant. Respondents to the survey where asked about their religious
aﬃliation, and if none was answered, they were further asked what was the religion
they were brought up in. Therefore, such missing values most likely correspond to
preferred omission of own religious beliefs. Nevertheless, a measure of religious diversity
at the neighbourhood level can be retrieved from Census 2011 data.
Also, neighbourhood deprivation can be an important explanatory factor for the life
satisfaction gaps. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are typically more likely to live in
more deprived and more ethnically concentrated urban areas [Clark and Drinkwater,
2002; Dorsett, 1998; Petersen and Rabe, 2013].
Studies on the eﬀect of neighbourhood characteristics on the subjective well-being of
immigrants and ethnic minorities in the UK are very few and show mixed results.
Becares et al. [2009] analyses the buﬀering eﬀects of ethnic density on experienced racism
and health of ethnic minority people in the UK. Results show that when conditioning
on area deprivation, ethnic density and mental health have a positive association.
Becares et al. [2011] investigates the association between social cohesion and ethnic
residential concentration, composition and deprivation for ethnic minorities in the UK.
Findings show that, once controlling for area deprivation, the positive association
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between own-group ethnic composition and social cohesion increases for ethnic minority
people. This research suggests that it is not the neighbourhood ethnic proﬁle but
neighbourhood deprivation that undermines social cohesion for both ethnic minorities
and white British people. Sturgis et al. [2013] analyse ethnic diversity, segregation and
social cohesion in neighbourhoods in London. The authors ﬁnd a positive association
between social cohesion and ethnic diversity, once accounting for neighbourhood
deprivation. Ethnic segregation is instead associated with lower perceived social
cohesion. Knies et al. [2013] study the eﬀect of neighbourhood ethnic composition on life
satisfaction of ethnic minorities in the UK, while adjusting for neighbourhood type, using
micro-marketing data, and for median neighbourhood income. Neighbourhood type and
proportion of co-ethnics seem to have no signiﬁcant beneﬁt for the life satisfaction of
ethnic minorities, with the only exception of African communities.
The ﬁndings for the 2.5 immigrant generation are instead somewhat unexpected. The
presence of a native-born parent is supposed to make a diﬀerence in terms of experiences
and outcomes of the oﬀspring. The general expectation is that the 2.5 generation avoids
most of the cultural conﬂict faced by generation 2. These unexpected results make the
analysis of locality characteristics interesting for this generation as well.
In order to proceed with the analysis the dataset with Census 2011 data I deﬁne
neighbourhoods in terms of Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs). LSOAs belong
to the Super Output Areas (SOAs), a set of three geographical units designed from
the 2001 census for the computation of indeces of deprivation and other neighbourhood
statistics. LSOAs are consistent in size across the country and more stable over time as
they are less likely to be subjected to frequent boundary changes unlike electoral wards.
LSOAs have a minimum population of 1,000 individuals, with an overall mean of 1,500.
They contain from 4 to 6 Output Areas (OAs), aggregated on the basis of similar social
characteristics. OAs are the lowest neighbourhood-level statistical units of analysis, with
a minimum population size of 100 and an overall mean of 300. LSOAs can be aggregated
into Middle Layer Super Output Areas (MSOAs), to form higher geographical areas with
a minimum population of 5,000 individuals with an overall mean of 7,200. Furthermore,
I link the dataset to the 2010 Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores adjusted
to align with 2011 LSOAs for England, information made recently publicly available
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from Public Health England. Each constituent country in the UK computes their own
IMD, therefore IMD scores between constituent countries are not directly comparable.
I therefore choose to restrict the sample of analysis to England.
IMDs are intended to measure deprivation in a broad sense, taking into account lack of
resources in multiple life domains. The English IMD 2010 is an overall index computed
combining 38 indicators, constructed across seven weighted domains of deprivation
(income, employment, health and disability, education skills and training, barriers to
housing and other services, crime, living environment)1. The higher the score, the higher
the average level of deprivation in the LSOA. From 2011 census data I can construct
neighbourhood-level variables regarding ethnic density, ethnic and religious diversity.
Following Becares et al. (2009) I proxy ethnic density in two ways, i.e. as the share of co-
ethnics (own-ethnic density) as well as the percentage of minority people (overall ethnic
minority density) living in the same neighbourhood of an individual. In line with the
literature, I measure ethnic and religious diversity using the so called Fractionalization





where sk,n is the share of the k
th ethnic or religious group in neighbourhood n. This
index is in fact 1 minus the Herﬁndal-Hirschman concentration Index (HHI).
Neighbourhood-level descriptive statistics are show in table 1.4. Generation 1 and 2
show similar patterns as opposed to the other groups. The further the generation, the
lower the level of overall neighbourhood deprivation. There is a big drop (about 10
percentage points) in the IMD between generations 1 and 2 (31 to 32%) and the other
groups (23 to 20%). Overall ethnic minority density is highest for generation 2 (57 %)
followed by generation 1 (56%), it then halves for generation 2.5 and reduces to a quar-
ter for natives. As regards own ethnic density, generation 1 individuals are the most
likely to live in neighbourhoods with less presence of co-ethnic people, showing a rate of
16%. Own ethnic density increases to 24% for generation 2, almost triples for generation
2.5 and quadruplicates for natives. In line with overall ethnic minority density, ethnic
diversity and religious diversity are highest in neighbourhoods where generation 1 and
1For a detailed description of the computation of the English IMD 2010 see McLennan et al.
[2011].
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2 individuals reside, followed by a big drop coinciding with generation 2.5. Finally, it
is important to take into account the distribution of groups in and out of London 1.
About half of generation 1 and 2 individuals live in London. This proportion more than
halves with generation 2.5 and further drops with generation 3. In comparison, only 6%
of natives lives in the capital. I expect a negative relationship between life satisfaction
and overall ethnic minority density or ethnic diversity. These two variables are highly
correlated, so that I include them into separate speciﬁcations. Furthermore, I expect a
positive buﬀering eﬀect of own-ethnic density while a negative association with religious
diversity. However, large part of these relationships could be driven by deprivation given
that ethnic minorities are most likely to reside in highly deprived neighbourhoods. Also,
it is important to consider that London neighbourhoods present a more distinctive eth-
nic and cultural composition as well as liveability conditions with respect to the rest of
England.
Table 1.8 shows the ﬁrst piece of regressions' results. Besides restricting the sample
to England, the dummy for low ethnic minority areas is excluded as the focus is now
switched on the association between life satisfaction and high density ethnic minority
areas.
Column (1) shows that estimates do not alter when the sample of analysis is restricted
to England.
Column (2) accounts for the overall neighbourhood ethnic minority density, which as
expected, has a negative signiﬁcant association with individual life satisfaction.
Column (3) further controls for own ethnic density, which has a positive but non-
signiﬁcant association. Its inclusion makes the association of overall ethnic minority
density to drop by 6 percentage points and lose any statistical signiﬁcance. The two
associations appear to counterbalance. Column (4) includes neighbourhood depriva-
tion, which appears signiﬁcantly negatively associated with individual life satisfaction,
although having a very low magnitude. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient for overall ethnic
minority density drops by 10 percentage points when conditioning on neighbourhood
deprivation. This seems to suggest that ethnic density may be picking up a selection
eﬀect rather than a true eﬀect.
1London neighbourhoods are here deﬁned as belonging to the London county, including inner
and greater London.
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Religious diversity in column (5) appears to a have a large negative association although
not signiﬁcant. The data show that the only neighbourhood-level characteristic having
a signiﬁcant association with overall individual life satisfaction is deprivation. The point
estimates for generations 2 and 2.5 remain robust in magnitude and signiﬁcant through-
out all the speciﬁcations. This ﬁnding seems to suggest that the life satisfaction gaps of
the middle generations do not depend on neighbourhood speciﬁc characteristics.
Finally, in column (6) the sample excludes all neighbourhoods living in the county of
London. As a result, the generation 2 coeﬃcient drops by about 12 percentage points
and turns not signiﬁcant. Outside of London, generation 2 immigrants therefore do not
appear less satisﬁed than their native peers. Table 1.6 conﬁrms the results, where ethnic
diversity replaces overall ethnic minority density in the speciﬁcations.
1.7 Robustness Checks
A number of robustness checks are performed to test the consistency of the estimates
from tables 1.8 and 1.6. Firstly, tables 1.7 and 1.8 reproduce the regression
speciﬁcations deﬁning immigrant groups by using the traditional classiﬁcation of
immigrant generations by country of birth rather than country of birth combined with
age at arrival. The estimates appear robust with respect to the deﬁnition of immigrant
generation.
Secondly, regressions in tables 1.8 and 1.8 use ordered logit models in order to check
whether the main ﬁndings are robust to splits in the data. The ordered logit point
estimates of generation 2 in column (2) of table 1.8 drop signiﬁcance, as overall ethnic
minority density is controlled for, and the result persists throughout the rest of the
columns. The same result is found in table 1.8, where ethnic diversity replaces overall
ethnic minority density. This points towards the failure of the parallel regression
assumption.
Finally, I re-estimate the logit models while changing the cut-oﬀ for the dependent
variable in tables 1.8 and 1.8. The dependent variable is reduced to a dummy with
value equal to 1 when the individual is at least somewhat satisﬁed (categories 5-7) and
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0 otherwise. In column (2) of both tables, the point estimates for generation 2 lose
statistical signiﬁcance as overall ethnic minority density is controlled for. This conﬁrms
that estimates for generation 2 are indeed not robust to splits in the data. Once again,
neighbourhood deprivation conﬁrms to be the relevant neighbourhood-level explanatory
factor. This result does not alter when the other neighbourhood-speciﬁc controls are
included.
In conclusion, on the one side this analysis suggests that conditioning on neighbourhood
deprivation, being a second generation immigrant does not aﬀect the probability of being
at least somewhat satisﬁed. On the other side, it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability for
second generation immigrants of being mostly satisﬁed or higher, but not so for those
living outside the London area. The signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of generation 2.5 persists
throughout all the speciﬁcations and remains an unsolved puzzle.
1.8 Conclusions
This study compares the life satisfaction of diﬀerent immigrant generations as opposed
to the native population in the UK. In the ﬁrst part of the analysis I explore the role of a
number of socio-demographic factors, i.e. ethnicity, home ownership, locality variables,
occupational background. Ethnic characteristics play a substantial role in explaining the
life satisfaction gaps of generation 1 and generation 2 with respect to natives. Further-
more, generation 1 immigrants with less than 10 years since migration do not appear
less happy than natives, when home-ownership is taken into account. Results highlight
robust evidence for signiﬁcant lower life satisfaction experienced by generations 2 and
2.5 with respect to natives, which persists even after all control variables are taken into
account. Assimilation seems to be achieved by the third immigrant generation. In the
second part of the analysis the focus is restricted on investigating the potential role
of neighbourhood characteristics as possible determinants of the lower life satisfaction
of the middle immigrant generations with respect to the native population. The main
dataset is matched with data from census 2011 and with the 2010 IMD scores at LSOA
level for England in order to test the associations of life satisfaction with ethnic density,
ethnic diversity, deprivation and religious diversity.
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The analysis' results oﬀer important insights for policy making. The assimilation of
immigrants does not show a linear trend. Life satisfaction diﬀerences with respect to
the native population widen with the second generation while fade away with the third
generation. Ethnicity seems to play an important role in explaining well-being of im-
migrant groups at the individual dimension. When people's ethnic self identiﬁcation is
taken into account the life satisfaction gaps suﬀered by the ﬁrst and second generations
halves. Once accounting for home ownership, ﬁrst generation immigrants do not longer
diﬀer in terms of well-being from their native peers. Among neighbourhood character-
istics, deprivation appears as the relevant control factor. Final results show, on the one
side, that conditioning on neighbourhood deprivation, being a second generation immi-
grant does not aﬀect the probability of being at least somewhat satisﬁed. On the other
side, it signiﬁcantly aﬀects the probability for second generation immigrants of being
mostly satisﬁed or higher, but not so for those living outside the London area.
This evidence may reassure policy makers in showing potential for intervention on ob-
jective economic conditions. Neighbourhood-level overall ethnic minority density and
diversity appear in fact less important when deprivation is taken into account. Also,
only second generation immigrants living in London neighbourhoods register well-being
gaps with respect to their native peers. The signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of generation
2.5 persists across all the regression speciﬁcations and remains an unsolved puzzle that






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Regression Analysis: Basic Socio-demographic Controls
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Generation 1 -0.5059*** -0.4311*** -0.4351***
(0.037) (0.049) (0.049)
Generation 1 * (ysm>10) -0.1490**
(0.063)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.2526***
(0.083)
Generation 1 * (20<ysm≤30) -0.0624
(0.109)
Generation 1 * (30<ysm≤50) -0.1016
(0.088)
Generation 1 * (ysm>50) -0.0239
(0.179)
Generation 2 -0.5923*** -0.5858*** -0.5890***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Generation 2.5 -0.2221*** -0.2194*** -0.2206***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Generation 3 -0.1098*** -0.1077*** -0.1085***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Male -0.1529*** -0.1535*** -0.1531***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Age -0.0653*** -0.0644*** -0.0644***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age2 0.0008*** 0.0008*** 0.0008***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Degree or higher 0.2067*** 0.2020*** 0.2033***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Longstanding illness\ -0.7427*** -0.7408*** -0.7415***
impairment (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Partner 0.4892*** 0.4869*** 0.4871***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Belong to a religion 0.0731*** 0.0706*** 0.0720***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Child -0.2416*** -0.2388*** -0.2361***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Unemployment -0.5199*** -0.5194*** -0.5196***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Net household income 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 36,484 36,484 36,484
Notes: The dependent variable is LS, dummy variable for "mostly or higher" satisfaction.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.3: Regression Analysis: All Controls
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 -0.4351*** -0.2149*** -0.0509 -0.0248 -0.0112 0.0877
(0.049) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.105)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.2526*** -0.2300*** -0.3214*** -0.3162*** -0.3189*** -0.2926***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.102)
Generation 1 * (ysm>20) -0.0811 -0.0359 -0.1763** -0.1684** -0.1690** -0.1501
(0.074) (0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.105)
Generation 2 -0.5890*** -0.3106*** -0.3004*** -0.2690*** -0.2610*** -0.2632***
(0.049) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.094)
Generation 2.5 -0.2206*** -0.1567*** -0.1497*** -0.1361*** -0.1343** -0.1600**
(0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.065)
Generation 3 -0.1085*** -0.0924** -0.0817* -0.0747* -0.0707* -0.0717
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.056)
White British 0.2939*** 0.3376*** 0.3144*** 0.3132*** 0.3360***
(0.088) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.113)
Other white 0.2720*** 0.3206*** 0.2934*** 0.2812*** 0.2543**
(0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.104)
Pakistani -0.1303 -0.1568 -0.1518 -0.1512 0.0237
(0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.134)
Bangladeshi -0.1546 -0.0878 -0.0841 -0.0866 -0.2453
(0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) (0.155)
Caribbean -0.1002 -0.0247 -0.0189 -0.0196 -0.0439
(0.105) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.137)
African 0.0699 0.1685* 0.1690* 0.1667* 0.0481
(0.097) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098) (0.124)
Mixed ethnicity 0.0001 0.0701 0.0728 0.0737 0.0812
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.147)
Other ethnicity -0.0256 0.0111 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0913
(0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.087) (0.110)
Owned house 0.3586*** 0.3528*** 0.3506*** 0.2643***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.037)
Rest of UK 0.0854*** 0.0629* 0.1380***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.044)
Low density ethnic minority area 0.0656** 0.0299 0.0063
(0.027) (0.028) (0.036)




Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 36,484 36,467 36,397 36,397 36,397 20,861
Notes: The dependent variable is LS, dummy variable for "mostly or higher" satisfaction.
ysm stands for years since migration.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5: Regression Analysis:
Neighbourhood-level Controls (1)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.1011 0.1317 0.1374 0.1335 0.1313 0.2127
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.152)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3617*** -0.3548*** -0.3526*** -0.3520*** -0.3518*** -0.4919***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.151)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.1654 -0.1517 -0.1500 -0.1583 -0.1565 -0.0463
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.153)
Generation 2 -0.2597** -0.2240** -0.2148** -0.2197** -0.2219** -0.1030
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.126)
Generation 2.5 -0.2008*** -0.1883*** -0.1822** -0.1827** -0.1824** -0.2053***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.078)
Generation 3 -0.0642 -0.0562 -0.0518 -0.0543 -0.0543 -0.0672
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)
White British 0.3836*** 0.3241*** 0.2439* 0.2557* 0.2738* 0.2756
(0.123) (0.125) (0.140) (0.140) (0.142) (0.191)
Other White 0.3276*** 0.2737** 0.3046*** 0.3066*** 0.2986** 0.2212
(0.112) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.152)
Pakistani 0.0803 0.1048 0.0846 0.1218 0.1085 0.0542
(0.136) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.176)
Bangladeshi -0.2019 -0.1696 -0.1982 -0.1481 -0.1541 -0.2431
(0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.159) (0.160) (0.258)
Caribbean 0.0010 0.0033 0.0202 0.0417 0.0329 -0.0348
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.208)
African 0.1211 0.1119 0.1249 0.1551 0.1469 -0.1493
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.193)
Mixed ethnicity 0.1161 0.0964 0.1327 0.1493 0.1366 0.0885
(0.152) (0.153) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156) (0.206)
Other ethnicity -0.1147 -0.1445 -0.1127 -0.1029 -0.1110 -0.2954*
(0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.160)
House ownership 0.2731*** 0.2596*** 0.2570*** 0.2369*** 0.2335*** 0.2378***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046)
Urban area -0.0681 -0.0416 -0.0332 -0.0119 -0.0082 -0.0074
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Professional/Manager 0.2179*** 0.2181*** 0.2200*** 0.2122*** 0.2117*** 0.1896***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
Overall ethnic minority density -0.2365** -0.1761 -0.0701 -0.0214 -0.0089
(0.096) (0.108) (0.112) (0.123) (0.164)
Own ethnic density 0.1659 0.1669 0.1223 0.0612
(0.131) (0.131) (0.139) (0.194)
Deprivation -0.0046*** -0.0046*** -0.0057***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Diversity -0.2395 -0.2021
(0.259) (0.287)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 14,563
Notes: The dependent variable is LS, dummy variable for "mostly or higher" satisfaction.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.6: Regression Analysis:
Neighbourhood-level Controls (2)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.1011 0.1251 0.1289 0.1291 0.1263 0.2102
(0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.119) (0.152)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3617*** -0.3549*** -0.3538*** -0.3527*** -0.3528*** -0.4907***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) (0.151)
Generation 1 * (ysm>20) -0.1654 -0.1523 -0.1524 -0.1603 -0.1591 -0.0459
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.153)
Generation 2 -0.2597** -0.2293** -0.2233** -0.2243** -0.2275** -0.1058
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.104) (0.126)
Generation 2.5 -0.2008*** -0.1876*** -0.1837*** -0.1837*** -0.1837*** -0.2061***
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.078)
Generation 3 -0.0642 -0.0552 -0.0525 -0.0549 -0.0553 -0.0678
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)
White British 0.3836*** 0.3416*** 0.2644* 0.2587* 0.2613* 0.2591
(0.123) (0.124) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.196)
Other White 0.3276*** 0.2973*** 0.3261*** 0.3193*** 0.3127*** 0.2350
(0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.152)
Pakistani 0.0803 0.0895 0.0722 0.1162 0.0950 0.0373
(0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) (0.176)
Bangladeshi -0.2019 -0.1922 -0.2162 -0.1558 -0.1661 -0.2505
(0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.159) (0.258)
Caribbean 0.0010 0.0118 0.0247 0.0448 0.0320 -0.0330
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.208)
African 0.1211 0.1239 0.1332 0.1601 0.1470 -0.1439
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.192)
Mixed ethnicity 0.1161 0.1108 0.1436 0.1576 0.1451 0.0988
(0.152) (0.152) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156) (0.206)
Other ethnicity -0.1147 -0.1266 -0.0981 -0.0936 -0.1008 -0.2838*
(0.114) (0.114) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.160)
House ownership 0.2731*** 0.2589*** 0.2585*** 0.2376*** 0.2342*** 0.2379***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046)
Urban area -0.0681 -0.0371 -0.0344 -0.0131 -0.0116 -0.0096
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Professional/Manager 0.2179*** 0.2193*** 0.2207*** 0.2122*** 0.2114*** 0.1894***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
Ethnic diversity -0.1950** -0.1179 -0.0256 0.0806 0.0629
(0.088) (0.114) (0.116) (0.146) (0.188)
Own ethnic density 0.1630 0.1819 0.1660 0.1005
(0.150) (0.150) (0.151) (0.215)
Deprivation -0.0048*** -0.0048*** -0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Diversity -0.3545 -0.2620
(0.294) (0.323)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 14,563
Notes: The dependent variable is LS, dummy variable for "mostly or higher" satisfaction.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
27
Table 1.7: Robustness Check: Country of Birth (1)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.0598 0.0918 0.0975 0.0924 0.0907 0.2212
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.147)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3209*** -0.3148*** -0.3129*** -0.3112*** -0.3112*** -0.4824***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.148)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.1194 -0.1065 -0.1051 -0.1121 -0.1106 -0.0365
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.149)
Generation 2 -0.2538** -0.2183** -0.2090** -0.2128** -0.2152** -0.1188
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.127)
Generation 2.5 -0.2081*** -0.1956*** -0.1899*** -0.1897*** -0.1892*** -0.2056***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079)
Generation 3 -0.0485 -0.0410 -0.0369 -0.0391 -0.0391 -0.0521
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066)
White British 0.3878*** 0.3267*** 0.2431* 0.2545* 0.2729* 0.2889
(0.123) (0.125) (0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.191)
Other White 0.3433*** 0.2879** 0.3199*** 0.3223*** 0.3142*** 0.2157
(0.112) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.152)
Pakistani 0.0603 0.0857 0.0649 0.1013 0.0880 0.0410
(0.136) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) (0.176)
Bangladeshi -0.2316 -0.1981 -0.2276 -0.1781 -0.1842 -0.2719
(0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.160) (0.160) (0.258)
Caribbean -0.0035 -0.0008 0.0167 0.0374 0.0286 -0.0199
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139) (0.209)
African 0.1318 0.1223 0.1357 0.1659 0.1575 -0.1476
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.127) (0.192)
Mixed ethnicity 0.1187 0.0986 0.1364 0.1525 0.1396 0.0888
(0.152) (0.152) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156) (0.206)
Other ethnicity -0.1072 -0.1379 -0.1048 -0.0949 -0.1031 -0.2958*
(0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.160)
House ownership 0.2653*** 0.2516*** 0.2489*** 0.2290*** 0.2256*** 0.2359***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046)
Urban area -0.0674 -0.0403 -0.0315 -0.0105 -0.0068 -0.0067
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Professional/Manager 0.2143*** 0.2145*** 0.2166*** 0.2088*** 0.2083*** 0.1881***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
Overall ethnic minority density -0.2420** -0.1792* -0.0745 -0.0253 -0.0124
(0.096) (0.108) (0.112) (0.123) (0.164)
Own ethnic density 0.1723 0.1734 0.1283 0.0608
(0.131) (0.131) (0.139) (0.194)
Deprivation -0.0045*** -0.0046*** -0.0057***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Diversity -0.2421 -0.2015
(0.259) (0.287)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,464 17,464 17,464 17,464 17,464 14,563
Notes: The dependent variable is LS, dummy variable for "mostly or higher" satisfaction.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.8: Robustness Check: Country of Birth (2)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.0598 0.0854 0.0890 0.0879 0.0855 0.2185
(0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.147)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3209*** -0.3150*** -0.3140*** -0.3118*** -0.3121*** -0.4811***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.148)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.1194 -0.1071 -0.1073 -0.1139 -0.1130 -0.0360
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.149)
Generation 2 -0.2538** -0.2235** -0.2175** -0.2173** -0.2208** -0.1216
(0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.127)
Generation 2.5 -0.2081*** -0.1948*** -0.1913*** -0.1906*** -0.1906*** -0.2064***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.079)
Generation 3 -0.0485 -0.0399 -0.0374 -0.0396 -0.0401 -0.0527
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.067)
White British 0.3878*** 0.3442*** 0.2644* 0.2584* 0.2612* 0.2735
(0.123) (0.124) (0.144) (0.144) (0.144) (0.196)
Other White 0.3433*** 0.3117*** 0.3414*** 0.3352*** 0.3284*** 0.2294
(0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.152)
Pakistani 0.0603 0.0703 0.0525 0.0957 0.0745 0.0244
(0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.138) (0.139) (0.176)
Bangladeshi -0.2316 -0.2210 -0.2457 -0.1861 -0.1963 -0.2793
(0.157) (0.157) (0.158) (0.159) (0.159) (0.257)
Caribbean -0.0035 0.0080 0.0212 0.0405 0.0278 -0.0181
(0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.139) (0.208)
African 0.1318 0.1345 0.1440 0.1710 0.1578 -0.1422
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.191)
Mixed ethnicity 0.1187 0.1133 0.1472 0.1606 0.1482 0.0989
(0.152) (0.152) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156) (0.206)
Other ethnicity -0.1072 -0.1197 -0.0903 -0.0856 -0.0929 -0.2843*
(0.114) (0.114) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.160)
House ownership 0.2653*** 0.2508*** 0.2505*** 0.2295*** 0.2262*** 0.2360***
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.046)
Urban area -0.0674 -0.0354 -0.0327 -0.0116 -0.0102 -0.0087
(0.045) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Professional/Manager 0.2143*** 0.2158*** 0.2173*** 0.2088*** 0.2080*** 0.1880***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041)
Ethnic diversity -0.2011** -0.1216 -0.0304 0.0759 0.0577
(0.088) (0.114) (0.116) (0.146) (0.188)
Own ethnic density 0.1680 0.1867 0.1708 0.0982
(0.151) (0.150) (0.151) (0.215)
Deprivation -0.0047*** -0.0048*** -0.0058***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Diversity -0.3551 -0.2587
(0.294) (0.323)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,464 17,464 17,464 17,464 17,464 14,562
Notes: The dependent variable is LS, dummy variable for "mostly or higher" satisfaction.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check: Ordered Logit (1)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.1562 0.1893* 0.1982* 0.1946* 0.1914* 0.2088
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.141)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3678*** -0.3595*** -0.3574*** -0.3572*** -0.3574*** -0.4573***
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.136)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.1458 -0.1306 -0.1285 -0.1361 -0.1340 0.0669
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.143)
Generation 2 -0.2002** -0.1647* -0.1483 -0.1532 -0.1556* -0.0267
(0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.116)
Generation 2.5 -0.2133*** -0.2004*** -0.1898*** -0.1906*** -0.1902*** -0.2170***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068)
Generation 3 -0.0521 -0.0441 -0.0374 -0.0403 -0.0400 -0.0418
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058)
White British 0.3204*** 0.2632** 0.1323 0.1403 0.1696 0.3180*
(0.116) (0.116) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) (0.181)
Other White 0.2783*** 0.2248** 0.2734*** 0.2748*** 0.2627** 0.2162
(0.100) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.133)
Pakistani 0.0889 0.1160 0.0804 0.1113 0.0894 0.1434
(0.136) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.175)
Bangladeshi -0.1535 -0.1152 -0.1683 -0.1305 -0.1414 -0.3026
(0.144) (0.146) (0.149) (0.149) (0.150) (0.287)
Caribbean 0.0208 0.0276 0.0510 0.0699 0.0557 -0.0393
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.191)
African 0.1332 0.1247 0.1450 0.1679 0.1545 0.0329
(0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.175)
Mixed ethnicity 0.0895 0.0741 0.1289 0.1425 0.1227 0.0500
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.143) (0.189)
Other ethnicity -0.0468 -0.0761 -0.0264 -0.0192 -0.0319 -0.1298
(0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.135)
House ownership 0.2502*** 0.2363*** 0.2321*** 0.2163*** 0.2104*** 0.2134***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Urban area -0.0624 -0.0357 -0.0220 -0.0062 -0.0003 0.0012
(0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Professional/Manager 0.1745*** 0.1747*** 0.1779*** 0.1719*** 0.1707*** 0.1435***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036)
Overall ethnic minority density -0.2411*** -0.1420 -0.0578 0.0220 -0.0535
(0.086) (0.098) (0.102) (0.115) (0.156)
Own ethnic density 0.2678** 0.2686** 0.1982 -0.0099
(0.122) (0.122) (0.129) (0.181)
Deprivation -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0049***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Diversity -0.3863 -0.3719
(0.243) (0.272)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 14,563
Notes: The life satisfaction dependent variable is an ordered variable taking values 1-7, ranging from completely
dissatisﬁed to completely satisﬁed.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Check: Ordered Logit (2)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.1562 0.1867* 0.1923* 0.1925* 0.1896* 0.2069
(0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.141)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3678*** -0.3585*** -0.3580*** -0.3573*** -0.3583*** -0.4578***
(0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.136)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.1458 -0.1286 -0.1293 -0.1363 -0.1358 0.0661
(0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.143)
Generation 2 -0.2002** -0.1634* -0.1532 -0.1550* -0.1575* -0.0292
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.116)
Generation 2.5 -0.2133*** -0.1969*** -0.1905*** -0.1908*** -0.1908*** -0.2174***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.068)
Generation 3 -0.0521 -0.0410 -0.0374 -0.0402 -0.0407 -0.0421
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058)
White British 0.3204*** 0.2714** 0.1563 0.1513 0.1547 0.3198*
(0.116) (0.116) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.188)
Other White 0.2783*** 0.2426** 0.2831*** 0.2776*** 0.2688*** 0.2236*
(0.100) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.133)
Pakistani 0.0889 0.1013 0.0737 0.1097 0.0809 0.1333
(0.136) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.176)
Bangladeshi -0.1535 -0.1388 -0.1791 -0.1334 -0.1488 -0.3104
(0.144) (0.144) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.285)
Caribbean 0.0208 0.0368 0.0526 0.0708 0.0534 -0.0387
(0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.191)
African 0.1332 0.1374 0.1504 0.1703 0.1523 0.0373
(0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.175)
Mixed ethnicity 0.0895 0.0868 0.1313 0.1429 0.1262 0.0548
(0.141) (0.141) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.188)
Other ethnicity -0.0468 -0.0615 -0.0210 -0.0178 -0.0271 -0.1237
(0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.102) (0.135)
House ownership 0.2502*** 0.2326*** 0.2320*** 0.2158*** 0.2109*** 0.2132***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.043)
Urban area -0.0624 -0.0246 -0.0204 -0.0049 -0.0031 0.0007
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Professional/Manager 0.1745*** 0.1761*** 0.1783*** 0.1719*** 0.1704*** 0.1435***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036)
Ethnic diversity -0.2396*** -0.1264 -0.0549 0.0860 -0.0187
(0.077) (0.101) (0.104) (0.132) (0.172)
Own ethnic density 0.2394* 0.2533* 0.2338* -0.0036
(0.140) (0.139) (0.140) (0.202)
Deprivation -0.0037*** -0.0038*** -0.0050***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Religious Diversity -0.4698* -0.3839
(0.274) (0.304)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 14,563
Notes: The life satisfaction dependent variable is an ordered variable taking values 1-7, ranging from completely
dissatisﬁed to completely satisﬁed.
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.11: Robustness Check: Cutoﬀ Change (1)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.1456 0.1850 0.1974 0.1897 0.1852 0.2036
(0.142) (0.142) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.181)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3368*** -0.3291*** -0.3237*** -0.3224*** -0.3228*** -0.4205**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.173)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.0727 -0.0573 -0.0529 -0.0627 -0.0585 0.2163
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.186)
Generation 2 -0.2381** -0.1942 -0.1734 -0.1811 -0.1859 0.0259
(0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.151)
Generation 2.5 -0.2152*** -0.1994** -0.1861** -0.1861** -0.1857** -0.1945**
(0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.090)
Generation 3 -0.0253 -0.0155 -0.0059 -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0045
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.079)
White British 0.4664*** 0.3954*** 0.2386 0.2500 0.2887* 0.5355**
(0.142) (0.145) (0.161) (0.161) (0.164) (0.230)
Other White 0.4760*** 0.4106*** 0.4723*** 0.4751*** 0.4564*** 0.3481*
(0.134) (0.136) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.181)
Pakistani 0.0732 0.1013 0.0626 0.1062 0.0781 0.1166
(0.147) (0.148) (0.149) (0.150) (0.150) (0.199)
Bangladeshi -0.0276 0.0098 -0.0454 0.0116 -0.0004 -0.4417
(0.160) (0.162) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) (0.271)
Caribbean 0.2252 0.2292 0.2621* 0.2873* 0.2684* 0.0873
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.225)
African 0.2230 0.2123 0.2379* 0.2729* 0.2552* 0.3003
(0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.221)
Mixed ethnicity 0.1904 0.1689 0.2408 0.2619 0.2335 -0.0375
(0.175) (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) (0.236)
Other ethnicity 0.2324* 0.1978 0.2606** 0.2707** 0.2525* 0.1452
(0.128) (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.186)
House ownership 0.2711*** 0.2557*** 0.2497*** 0.2248*** 0.2171*** 0.2184***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.053)
Urban area -0.0999* -0.0677 -0.0498 -0.0215 -0.0119 -0.0082
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Professional/Manager 0.3206*** 0.3207*** 0.3250*** 0.3153*** 0.3142*** 0.2963***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050)
Overall ethnic minority density -0.2821** -0.1678 -0.0421 0.0604 -0.0202
(0.110) (0.120) (0.125) (0.138) (0.188)
Own ethnic density 0.3294** 0.3325** 0.2328 -0.0739
(0.148) (0.148) (0.160) (0.232)
Deprivation -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.0067***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Religious Diversity -0.5364* -0.5367
(0.303) (0.343)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 14,563
Notes: The life satisfaction dependent variable is a dummy indicator for "somewhat satisﬁed or higher".
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 1.12: Robustness check: Cutoﬀ Change (2)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation 1 0.1456 0.1854 0.1918 0.1895 0.1845 0.2036
(0.142) (0.142) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.181)
Generation 1 * (10<ysm≤20) -0.3368*** -0.3270*** -0.3242*** -0.3222*** -0.3232*** -0.4209**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.173)
Generation 1 * (ysm >20) -0.0727 -0.0532 -0.0528 -0.0619 -0.0596 0.2161
(0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.186)
Generation 2 -0.2381** -0.1897 -0.1785 -0.1811 -0.1872 0.0256
(0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.119) (0.120) (0.151)
Generation 2.5 -0.2152*** -0.1937** -0.1865** -0.1857** -0.1864** -0.1945**
(0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.090)
Generation 3 -0.0253 -0.0110 -0.0059 -0.0084 -0.0092 -0.0044
(0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.079)
White British 0.4664*** 0.4020*** 0.2730 0.2639 0.2683 0.5411**
(0.142) (0.143) (0.167) (0.166) (0.167) (0.237)
Other White 0.4760*** 0.4296*** 0.4789*** 0.4718*** 0.4602*** 0.3476*
(0.134) (0.135) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.182)
Pakistani 0.0732 0.0865 0.0579 0.1073 0.0708 0.1172
(0.147) (0.147) (0.149) (0.150) (0.151) (0.201)
Bangladeshi -0.0276 -0.0133 -0.0532 0.0126 -0.0049 -0.4422
(0.160) (0.160) (0.162) (0.163) (0.163) (0.270)
Caribbean 0.2252 0.2436 0.2643* 0.2874* 0.2651* 0.0874
(0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.149) (0.225)
African 0.2230 0.2283 0.2436* 0.2736** 0.2509* 0.3009
(0.139) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.140) (0.220)
Mixed ethnicity 0.1904 0.1851 0.2402 0.2582 0.2362 -0.0379
(0.175) (0.176) (0.178) (0.178) (0.179) (0.236)
Other ethnicity 0.2324* 0.2157* 0.2638** 0.2680** 0.2553* 0.1448
(0.128) (0.128) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.186)
House ownership 0.2711*** 0.2498*** 0.2488*** 0.2238*** 0.2177*** 0.2184***
(0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.053)
Urban area -0.0999* -0.0509 -0.0462 -0.0189 -0.0154 -0.0078
(0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058)
Professional/Manager 0.3206*** 0.3227*** 0.3255*** 0.3154*** 0.3139*** 0.2964***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050)
Ethnic diversity -0.3030*** -0.1708 -0.0636 0.1237 -0.0254
(0.103) (0.131) (0.134) (0.167) (0.218)
Own ethnic density 0.2778 0.3026* 0.2747 -0.0821
(0.174) (0.173) (0.175) (0.259)
Deprivation -0.0054*** -0.0055*** -0.0068***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Religious Diversity -0.6323* -0.5242
(0.343) (0.381)
Basic socio-demographic controls x x x x x x
Observations 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 17,465 14,563
Notes: The life satisfaction dependent variable is a dummy indicator for "somewhat satisﬁed or
higher".
ysm stands for years since migration.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Life Satisfaction, Frequency Distribution
The ﬁgure shows the frequency distribution of responses to the
question: How are you satisﬁed with your life overall? Values
1 to 7 stand for: completely dissatisﬁed, mostly dissatisﬁed,
somewhat dissatisﬁed, neither satisﬁed nor dissatisﬁed, mostly
satisﬁed, completely satisﬁed. This question is contained in the
self-completion questionnaire for which individuals aged 16 or over
are eligible.
Figure 1.2: Years since Migration, Frequency Distribution
The ﬁgure shows the frequency distribution of years since migration
for ﬁrst generation immigrants
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Chapter 2
Within-Firm Adjustments to Labour Supply Shocks: the
Role of Product and Process Innovation
Abstract
We present a model that illustrates the channels through which ﬁrms may adjust their
product and process innovation activities in response to labour supply shocks. We
empirically test the model with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation strategy exploiting
the large low-skill labour supply shock to local UK labour markets generated by the
2004 expansion of the European Union to Eastern European countries (EU8). On the
one hand, results show a negative but not signiﬁcant average eﬀect of EU8 immigration
on process innovation, challenging our model prediction. On the other hand, we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant and negative average eﬀect on product innovation, but only for ﬁrms in the
non-tradable sector. In line with our model, we interpret this last ﬁnding as suggesting
that the dominant response of ﬁrms has been to substitute away from a now relatively
more costly high-skill activity 1.
This chapter is part of a co-authored paper with Gregory Wright and Rowena
Gray2.
Key Words: Product Innovation, Process Innovation, Immigration, Labour Supply
Shock
1Data from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey and the Community Innovation Survey have
been made available by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) through the UK Data Archive
under secure access. Neither the ONS nor the UK Data Archive bear any responsibility for the
analysis or interpretation of the data reported here.
2Department of Economics, University of California, Merced.
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2.1 Introduction
Firms adapt to local labour supply shocks in a variety of ways  for instance, there is
evidence that ﬁrms alter their production methods to use the now more abundant factor
more intensively [Dustmann and Glitz, 2015; Lewis, 2003, 2011, 2013].
However, this evidence either focuses narrowly on adjustments in the capital stock within
ﬁrms [see, for example, Lewis [2011]] or else simply sets aside the issue of how and why
ﬁrms' production changes. In this paper we explore two potential channels of ﬁrm
response to labour supply shocks, namely, ﬁrm investments in process and in product
innovation, both of which will aﬀect the observed distribution of output within and
across ﬁrms.
We present a model in which heterogeneous ﬁrms produce an endogenous set of branded
varieties and employ both low- and high-skill workers. The ﬁrms' product and process
innovation decisions are made in order to achieve their optimal product scope and
their optimal production structure, respectively. In our comparative statics exercise
we focus speciﬁcally on a low-skill labour supply shock, ﬁrst ﬁnding that ﬁrms who
employ low-skill workers relatively more intensively will engage in relatively more process
innovation in response to the shock. We then show that product innovation could also,
in theory, increase in all ﬁrms for two reasons: ﬁrst, the increase in the local low-skill
labour supply will raise the demand for ﬁrms' products, which may incentivize the
development of new products; and second, the fall in the local low-skill wage due to the
increase in labour supply reduces ﬁrm production costs, which raises the proﬁtability
of all products, again incentivizing the development of new products. On the other
hand, to the extent that product innovation requires a high-skill workforce, a low-skill
labour supply shock will reduce product innovation when high- and low-skill workers are
imperfectly substitutable.
We bring the model's predictions to UK data by exploiting the expansion of the European
Union (EU) in 2004 as a diﬀerential shock to the local supply of low-skill labour
across UK travel-to-work areas (TTWA). On the one hand, we ﬁnd an average negative
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treatment eﬀect on product innovation, although only in the non-tradable sector. On
the other hand, we do not detect any average signiﬁcant eﬀect on process innovation.
However, we observe that larger ﬁrms respond more negatively to the low-skill labour
shocks by decreasing investments in process innovation relatively more than smaller
ﬁrms. This evidence challenges part of the predictions of our model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature. In
Section 2.3 we jointly model the ﬁrm's process and product innovation choice in the
face of a labour supply shock. Section 2.4 describes the data and section 2.5 introduces
the empirical speciﬁcations and identiﬁcation strategy. Section 2.6 shows descriptive
evidence and section 2.7 discusses the regression results. Section 2.8 concludes with the
main remarks.
2.2 Literature Review
The UK has experienced substantial growth in its immigrant population since the late
1990s. In particular, the European enlargement has generated a substantial shift in
the composition of immigrant inﬂows, as the number of Eastern European immigrants
increased dramatically.
A bulk of research has concentrated on analysing the cost and beneﬁts of immigration,
mainly focussing on the immigration impact on wages of native workers [Altonji and
Card, 1991; Borjas, 2003; Card, 2001a; David and Lewis, 2007; Dustmann et al., 2005,
2013; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012].
Estimated eﬀects are mixed although the empirical literature agrees that the impact of
immigration on average wages is relatively small and centered around zero [Longhi et al.,
2005, 2008]. Recent research suggests that the labour market impact of immigration on
wages may be mitigated by enriching the economy and production structure of labour
market models, leaving factor prices unchanged [Dustmann and Glitz, 2015; Lewis, 2003,
2011, 2013].
There are two main alternative adjustment channels that have been considered. The
ﬁrst adjustment is through changes in output-mix [Rybczynski, 1955]. Open economy
or closed multi-sectoral models allow for skill-mix shifts to be absorbed through the so
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called Rybczynski eﬀect (1955) expanding the output of those production units using
the more abundant labour type more intensively.
The second adjustment is through changes in production technology [Acemoglu, 1998,
2002; Beaudry and Green, 2003; Caselli and Coleman, 2006], such that ﬁrms adopt
technologies that are more intensive in the use of the now more abundant skill group.
Lewis [2003] examines the eﬀects of low-skilled inﬂows of Cuban immigrants to Miami
and Mexican immigrants to California on the growth rate of a set of industries and
shows that local skill-mix changes are largely absorbed within-industries (about 3/4
of total employment variation) without signiﬁcant wage changes. Lewis [2011] uses
detailed plant-level data and investigates the impact of immigration-induced labour
supply's skill-mix changes on the use and adoption of automation technologies in U.S.
manufacturing between 1980s and 1990s. Results show that metropolitan areas with
larger numbers of high-school dropouts per high-school graduate signiﬁcantly decreased
the use of automation equipment per unit of output. This suggests a substitution eﬀect
between low-skilled labour and automation technologies at the plant level.
Dustmann and Glitz [2015] use administrative data covering the whole universe of ﬁrms
and workers in Germany for the period 1985-1995, and exploit the large immigration
labour supply shocks occurred during the decade to identify these three mechanisms.
The study ﬁnds that immigration caused a decrease in the relative wages of skill groups
of workers that experienced a labour supply shock in the non-tradable sector but not in
the tradable and manufacturing industries. Thus, in the latter, adjustments may have
occurred through output-mix and/or technology adoption. A similar decomposition
to Lewis [2003] at the more detailed ﬁrm-level uncovers that within-ﬁrm technology
adjustments are more important than output-mix ones, conﬁrming Lewis [2003, 2011]'s
work at industry and plant level.
While providing convincing evidence on the endogenous choice of technique to labour
supply shocks of diﬀerent skill groups, the empirical literature clearly leaves still open
the question of what types of adjustments ﬁrms are making and, further, whether these
adjustments diﬀer systematically across ﬁrms in some way. The range of technology
choices examined in the literature has been quite narrow, with most evidence focused
on ﬁrms' adoption of either high-tech manufacturing equipment or computer purchases
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[Lewis, 2003, 2011].
We contribute to the literature by taking a novel approach and consider ﬁrm investments
in either process or product innovation. We argue that innovation can be seen as a
within-ﬁrm adjustment to relative labour supply shocks. For instance, when the ﬁrm
adjusts the relative eﬃciency of its inputs we can consider this to be process innovation,
or when the ﬁrm endogenously chooses its optimal product scope, we can refer to it
as product innovation. In particular, we consider two main channels through which
low-skilled immigration may aﬀect ﬁrms' innovation activities. On the one hand, we
hypothesize a substitution eﬀect, due to the ﬁrm's exploitation of the now more abundant
low skilled labour and consequently engage less in innovation activities. On the other
hand, we consider a complementary eﬀect, via the ﬁrm's investment of immigration-
induced savings in labour production costs in innovation activities. The theoretical
model is tested empirically by exploiting ﬁrm-level panel data and exploring UK ﬁrms'
adjustments in process and product innovation to changes in the local distribution of
workers' skills due the enlargement of the European Union in 2004.
2.3 Model
2.3.1 Consumers
There are M consumers in a local labor market who maximize utility over consumption
of a homogeneous good and a diﬀerentiated good. Agent m consumes some amount of
the homogeneous good along with some amount of each variety i ∈ Ωj associated with
brand j ∈ J of the diﬀerentiated good. Speciﬁcally, preferences of agent m are given by:




























ij di is the agent's
consumption of brand j varieties, Qm ≡ ∫j qmj dj is total consumption of all varieties
across all brands, and α, δ, η and ψ are constants. Consumers maximize this utility






ij didj = I
m, where Im is agent
m's income and pij is the price of variety i of brand j where p00 = 1 is the numeraire
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good. We further assume that qm0 > 0 and that all agents are identical. Maximizing
the utility function and aggregating the resulting individual demand functions across all
consumers, we get the following linear inverse demand for variety i of brand j:






where α˜ ≡ α − ψQm/M reﬂects demand conditions the ﬁrm takes as given. The linear
demand system (2.1) is useful, in part, because it is consistent with the empirical
ﬁndings of Hottman and Weinstein [2014] who show that variation in product scope
can explain a substantial portion of variation in sales across U.S. ﬁrms. In addition,
this demand system generates product cannibalization, a mechanism these authors ﬁnd
to be important in explaining ﬁrms' response to demand shocks. Finally, this demand
system also provides a tractable condition to pin down the range of products produced
by each ﬁrm, as we will show.
2.3.2 Firms
Each ﬁrm j is associated with a brand, and may supply multiple varieties within the
brand to its local labor market. Throughout the analysis we focus narrowly on a single
market, therefore setting aside considerations of geography. There is free entry in the
diﬀerentiated goods industry and, after paying a ﬁxed entry cost, f , ﬁrms can enter and
produce each variety i at marginal cost cij . The ﬁrm's production function combines
two labor types, high-skill and low-skill labor. An important feature of the model is
that the ﬁrm can choose from an array of production methods, conditional on its given
underlying production structure, and these diﬀer in their relative eﬃciency of use of the
inputs. When the ﬁrm adjusts the relative eﬃciency of its inputs we consider this to be
process innovation.
The idea is that ﬁrms may respond to a shock to the relative labor supply not only by
using labor types in diﬀerent proportions, but also by altering their production methods
to use the now-more-abundant factor more eﬃciently. Formally, the ﬁrm takes local
factor prices as given and chooses from a continuous menu of production technologies.
Beyond this, we assume a ﬁxed heterogeneity in the intensity of use of labor inputs
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across ﬁrms. As a result, while the ﬁrm is able to adjust the relative eﬃciency of its
inputs, it is simultaneously constrained by the unique, and ﬁxed, production structure
required to make its particular products.
Finally, apart from endogenously choosing the eﬃciency of its factors, the ﬁrm also
endogenously chooses its optimal product (variety) scope, which we refer to as product
innovation. As we will show, product innovation will, in part, depend on the ﬁrm's
choice of process innovation, and each type of innovation will independently respond to
labor supply shocks in the ﬁrm's local market.
Production. Having paid the ﬁxed entry cost, the ﬁrm's variety-speciﬁc production




ρ + (1− βij)(AijSSij)ρ
]1/ρ
(2.2)
where L and S are low-skill and high-skill labor inputs, the eﬃciency parameters A
augment each factor (and will become choice variables later on), and the elasticity
parameter ρ ≡ σ−1σ . The terms βij and 1−βij are exogenous, variety-speciﬁc technology
terms that deﬁne the ﬁxed input proportions ﬁrms are constrained to use to produce
their varieties. This feature reﬂects the fact that the factor content of output is to some
degree determined by the nature of the product being produced, and is therefore to some
extent outside of the ﬁrm's control (at least in the short run).
In order to more ﬂexibly deﬁne the notion of process innovation later on, we do
not explicitly incorporate capital in the production function. There are two primary
reasons: ﬁrst, many examples of process innovation combine organizational changes
with investments in capital, and it is more tractable to consider these jointly as an
increase in one of the eﬃciency variables, A. Second, process innovation may be, at
times, skill-biased and, at other times, unskill-biased. An example of the former is the
incorporation of computer-assisted design software for product development (which may
augment the productivity of engineers), while an example of the latter is the adoptions
of GPS systems for product delivery (which may augment the productivity of truck
drivers). The production function, (2.2), again allows us to ﬂexibly model these as
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diﬀerent types of investments in factor eﬃciency.1
The production function, (2.2), indicates that the ﬁrm is constrained in its production
process  reﬂected in the ﬁxed β  and at the same time has a degree of ﬂexibility
in that it can choose both the relative quantities of factors employed as well as the
relative eﬃciency of its inputs, AijL, AijS . Given the production function, (2.2), the
cost minimizing choice of inputs is given by the usual ﬁrst-order conditions (FOC) which
equate the (exogenously determined, from the ﬁrm's point of view) wage paid to each














When relative wages change, perhaps due to an increase in the local supply of one factor,
the ﬁrm responds by increasing its relative use of that factor, in order to reduce the
marginal productivity of the factor and bring it back in line with its wage (conditional
on the endogenous response of the eﬃciency terms). To be consistent in outlining the
testable elements of the model, this straightforward result is summarized in our ﬁrst
proposition:
Proposition 1 (Factor Adjustment) A decline in the local price of a factor will
induce ﬁrms to use that factor more intensively. This eﬀect is increasing in the ﬁrm's
ﬁxed reliance on the now-more-abundant input (β).
Unit Costs. It is useful from this point on to work with the ﬁrm's unit cost function,
which incorporates the ﬁrm's optimally chosen factor quantities, reﬂected in (2.3).
Formally, minimizing factor costs subject to (2.2), we obtain the unit cost cij associated














1An alternative would be to combine each labor type with a capital type in a CES
combination, with each combination then combined in an upper CES nest. This would give
qualitatively similar results in a more complex setting.
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where wl are factor prices that the ﬁrm takes as given, with l ∈ (L, S), and the
terms Al and β are the endogenous and exogenous technology terms, respectively.
Process Innovation. We deﬁne process innovation to be a shift toward a new,
more eﬃcient production function by the ﬁrm. Speciﬁcally, we assume that any
adjustment along the frontier requires expenditure by the ﬁrm. Formally, we
assume that Aijl ≡ A˜ijl(1 + κijl), where κijl ∈ [0,∞) is the variety-speciﬁc cost of
increasing the eﬃciency of factor l and A˜ijl is the ﬁrm's baseline factor eﬃciency.
The ﬁrm can increase the eﬃciency of one of its factors by investing in process
innovation at a rate rijl, so that expenditure on process innovation is given by
rijlκijl.
1
Product Innovation. We assume that the ﬁrm chooses its optimal product
scope, hj, producing an additional variety at a cost rhwS. The assumption is
that product innovation  adding a new variety  requires payment of a variety-
speciﬁc R&D cost at rate rh, which is denominated in high-skill labor. For
instance, adding a new product may require R&D expenditure on the wages of
scientists and engineers, in contrast to process innovation which can perhaps be
done by incurring costs that are not dependent on the skill composition of the
ﬁrm's workforce.
1In a previous version we assumed that the ﬁrm faced a tradeoﬀ in the extent to which it
could engage in low-skill-biased process innovation versus high-skill-biased process innovation.
In that case, we followed Caselli and Coleman [2006] in modeling the shift as the choice of a new
(AL,AS) pair in the available technology space. More formally, the ﬁrm's technology frontier 






)α ≤ Bij (2.5)
where η and α govern the tradeoﬀ between the relative eﬃciency of each factor and B deﬁnes
the height of the technology frontier, and is ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
However, this produces nearly identical qualitative results, but with the size of the ﬁrm response
to a shock governed also by the additional parameters associated with the above technological
constraint. In this version we instead pursue the simpler case in which the ﬁrm faces no tradeoﬀ
with respect to performing either type of process innovation.
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where cij is given by (2.4). For tractability, we assume throughout that ﬁrms
and varieties are identical except for ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the production
technology  i.e., we assume that only βj varies across ﬁrms and that varieties are
identical within a ﬁrm. As a result, we can re-write (2.6) as:
Πj = hj
{[
pj − cj(κjL, κjS)
]
qj − rLκjL − rSκjS − rhwS
}
≡ hjpij (2.7)
where pij is the proﬁt associated with each variety produced by ﬁrm j and we
now simply write marginal costs as a function of the κ's. Note that since ﬁrms'
costs diﬀer  due to the heterogeneity in β  their prices, quantities, the level of
investment in process innovation and the number of varieties produced by a ﬁrm
will also diﬀer, and therefore carry subscripts j.
Equilibrium. We ﬁrst solve for optimal qj. Maximizing ﬁrm proﬁts, the FOC is
∂pij
∂qj















The optimal values of low- and high-skill process innovation are then given
by the proﬁt-maximizing expenditure on each, i.e., {κ∗jL, κ∗jS}. Since the FOC
are symmetric, we simply solve for the FOC for low-skill process innovation.
Calculating this FOC and plugging in the value for optimal q∗j , we get the following
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implicit equilibrium condition for κ∗jL:
Mβσj










σ−1 − α˜cj(κ∗jL, κjS)
σ
σ−1
]− (1− κ∗jL)σ = 0
(2.9)
Next, we explore the comparative static implications of the equilibrium conditions.
2.3.3 Comparative Statics
We are primarily interested in the comparative statics with respect to an increase
in the low-skill labor supply in an area, and so that is what we focus on here. The
ﬁrst response we are interested in is reﬂected in Proposition 1, whereby a local rise
in the supply of the low-skill factor increases its relative use by ﬁrms, and more
so for ﬁrms who are fundamentally more reliant on that factor. Next, we focus on
the associated cost function, (2.4), in which the endogenous choice of technique
 i.e., the choice of κijl  operates above and beyond the ﬁrm's adjustment of its
relative use of factors. In fact, the cost function explicitly incorporates the ﬁrm's
optimal choice of factors and, in this sense, reﬂects the ﬁrm's long-run costs.
In the analysis that follows we will assume that wL unambiguously falls when the
supply of low-skill labor rises, and that the relative factor adjustment summarized
in Proposition 1 only partially mitigates the fall in the low-skill wage generated
by the increased local supply of low-skill labor. In making this assumption,
we are able to highlight ﬁrms' innovation responses as a mechanism that may
subsequently put additional upward pressure on the relative low-skill wage, beyond
that due to the ﬁrm's adjustment of its relative use of factors.
Diﬀerentiating the implicit equilibrium condition (2.9), describing optimal low-
skill-biased process innovation, with respect to the low-skill wage wL, leads to the
following result:





0 iﬀ σ > 1, where κ∗jL is the ﬁrm's optimal investment in low-skill-biased process
innovation. In other words, a labor supply shock which reduces the average low-
skill wage leads to a rise in low-skill-biased process innovation on the part of ﬁrms.
Thus, a rise in the low-skill labor supply induces ﬁrms to increase the eﬃciency






− rL = 0, indicates that optimal process innovation
is increasing in ﬁrm output. We formalize this in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 (Role of Firm Size) Optimal process innovation is increasing in
ﬁrm output.
Furthermore, since ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their production structures, their
responses to the low-skill labor supply shock are also heterogeneous. Speciﬁcally,
∂κ∗jL
∂wL∂βj
< 0, such that ﬁrms whose production is relatively intensive in low-
skill labor increase their investments in process innovation relatively more. We
summarize this result in the following lemma:
Lemma 4 (Role of Firm Heterogeneity) The process innovation response to
a local labor supply shock is increasing in the ﬁrm's intensity of use of the now




Optimal Product Innovation. The FOC with respect to the ﬁrm's choice of
number of varieties is pinned down by the linear demand, (2.1). As shown by
Dhingra [2013], the linear demand system causes new varieties to cannibalize the
demand for existing varieties. As a result, the additional proﬁt that the ﬁrm
obtains due to an increase in product scope is countered by a decline in overall
proﬁts as demand for existing products falls. The balance of these forces pins
down the optimal number of varieties, where the proﬁt from the marginal variety
is equal to the decline in aggregate proﬁts due to cannibalization. This optimal
product scope is given by the solution to the FOC,
∂Πj
∂hj






Given this, an increase in the low-skill labor supply in an area generates three
primary eﬀects on the product margin. First, plugging in for the optimal quantity
 from (2.8)  and the optimal proﬁts  obtained by substituting optimal process
innovation from (2.9) and its high-skill counterpart into (2.7)  and diﬀerentiating
(2.10) with respect to the low-skill wage, we ﬁnd that
∂h∗j
∂wL
< 0. By reducing
production costs, the low-skill labor supply shock makes production of all varieties
more proﬁtable, which increases the equilibrium range of proﬁtable varieties.
Second, diﬀerentiating the same condition with respect to M , the size of the local
market, we ﬁnd that
∂h∗j
∂M
> 0. Since the labor supply shock will mechanically
increase the size of the local market, the labor supply shock will impact ﬁrms
on the demand side as well, again increasing the proﬁtability of all products and
thereby increasing ﬁrms' equilibrium optimal product scope. And third, since
low-skill labor and high-skill labor are imperfect substitutes, the fall in the low-
skill wage leads to an increase in the high-skill wage. Since the cost of product
innovation is denominated in terms of the price of high-skill workers, this reduces
the proﬁtability of all products, and therefore reduces the optimal product scope.
We summarize these ﬁndings in the following Proposition:
Proposition 5 (Product Innovation Response) From (2.10), there are three





< 0. By reducing production costs, a low-skill labor supply shock





> 0. By increasing the size of the local market, a low-skill labor supply





< 0. Due to the imperfect substitutability of high- and low-skill labor, a
low-skill labor supply shock increases the cost of product innovation, thereby
reducing product scope.
Proposition 5 indicates that the direction of the product innovation response to a
low-skill labor supply shock is ultimately ambiguous. This is because the relative
increase in the supply of low-skill labor generates productivity gains for the ﬁrm
(channel 1), but also increases the ﬁxed costs associated with product innovation
(channel 3). At the same time, the market for all products is now larger and this
is a force for increasing product innovation (channel 2).
2.4 Data
We investigate ﬁrms' responses in innovation to an immigration-induced labour
supply shock in their local labour market. Local labour markets are deﬁned as
UK Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs), geographical statistical units developed by
the Oﬃce of National Statistics (ONS) for the purpose of bounding commuting
zones.1 In short, these labour markets are deﬁned in order to cover both
metropolitan areas as well as their commuter suburbs.2 The variation in EU8
immigrants' labour supply across the TTWAs that we exploit in our descriptive
evidence comes from the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS). The QLFS
comprises a single-stage sample of households, implicitly stratiﬁed by geographical
ordering. Furthermore, it has a quarterly frequency and a rotating panel structure
such that each individual is staying in the sample for ﬁve consecutive quarters.
Each quarter covers approximately 100,000 individuals, making up about 0.2%
1We use the 1998 ONS deﬁnition of a TTWA, according to which there are 242 TTWAs in
England and Wales. Our sample covers 151 TTWAs.
2Formally, the ONS deﬁnes a TTWA as a collection of wards for which of the resident
economically active population, at least 75% actually work in the area, and also, that of everyone
working in the area, at least 75% actually live in the area.
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of the UK population. We retain individuals at their working age (16-64) and
responding to their ﬁrst interview. We make use of the available personal weights
to make the sample representative of the UK population and to correct for non-
response. A pitfall of the QLFS is that it is likely to underestimate the stock
of EU8 immigrants, especially the recent ones and those living in communal
establishments [Rokicka and Longhi [2012], Gilpin et al. [2006], Drinkwater et al.
[2009]]. In the main empirical section we exploit cross-sectional variation in EU8
immigrant shares from the 1991 Census, which we use to predict subsequent
concentrations over the 2004-2008 period, as we discuss further in Section 2.5
1.
Firm-level panel data on innovation activities are retrieved from three waves of
the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), covering the period 2002 to 2008. The
CIS is the primary source of information on innovation for the UK, and asks ﬁrms
a range of questions about their innovation activities as well as the extent to which
they have undertaken various types of organizational change during the previous
three years. The CIS consists of a stratiﬁed sample of approximately 28,000 ﬁrms
with more than 10 employees. For the period we are interested in, 2002-2008, the
CIS includes a panel of approximately 2,900 ﬁrms, and this is the sample we exploit
in our analysis. The attrition rate is very low (4%) and the vast majority of ﬁrms
operate in the same local labour market throughout the whole period (93 %). The
survey questionnaire states clearly what the responding ﬁrm should consider to be
a technological innovation, providing the following deﬁnition: New or signiﬁcantly
improved goods or services and/or processes used to produce or supply all goods or
services, that the business has introduced, regardless of their origin. These may be
new to the business or to the market. Furthermore, a set of selected examples of
activities help the respondent in asse ssing what could constitute product (goods
or services) or process innovation and examples of activities which instead are not
1The 1991 TTWA-level EU8 immigrant population distribution is retrieved from the NOMIS
website, a service provided by the ONS for UK labour market statistics. The yearly immigration
inﬂows for the period 1991-2004 is derived from ad-hoc commissioned data of the ONS Migration
Statistics Unit.
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technological innovations1. The product and process innovation outcome variables
have binary nature. For instance, the question that ﬁrms are asked regarding
their level of process innovation is the following: During the three-year period
..., did your enterprise introduce any new or signiﬁcantly improved processes for
producing or supplying products which were new to your enterprise or industry?
The CIS is conducted every two years, such that we exploit survey responses
regarding ﬁrms' innovation activities between 2002 and 2004  the period (mostly)
prior to the EU8 accession  as well as between 2004 and 2006 and 2006 and 2008.
The nature of the timing of the survey requires two comments. First, there is an
overlapping year in each wave, however this is inconsequential given the binary
nature of our outcome variables.2 For instance, if a ﬁrm reports product innovation
for the 2002-2004 period, and then no product innovation for 2004-2006, we know
that the ﬁrm engaged in product innovation in 2004 (and, of course, 2002-2003).
Second, the EU enlargement occurred on May 1st 2004, whereas 2004 falls in
our pre-period for ﬁrm outcomes (we do not rely on 2004 variation in immigrant
inﬂows). As a result, any response by ﬁrms from May through December of 2004
due to the immediate inﬂow of immigrants from EU8 countries will be allocated
to our pre-period control group, and this will work against ﬁnding an eﬀect due to
the EU8 accession  i.e., it will bias our results downward. Figure 2.1 documents
the trend in EU8 inﬂows during the period 2002-2008. We can see that there was
indeed an immediate uptick in EU8 immigration to the UK beginning in June,
2004, however the vast majority of the inﬂow occurred after December 2004.
As regards the geographical dimension, the CIS survey does not contain TTWA-
level data but provides the anonymized postcode district of each ﬁrm. Unlike
1For instance, the production of carbon ﬁbre based sport equipment, multi-function printers,
IT based credit risk assessment service, online estate agency can be regarded as product
innovation. The linking of computer aided design stations to parts suppliers or the digitization
of pre-press in printing house are types of service innovations. Instead, the renaming and
repackaging of an existing soft drink or the production of a new model of car involving minor
changes with respect to previous ones cannot be considered as technology based innovations as
deﬁned in the survey.
2We also exploit continuous variables from the CIS in our interaction regressions, but in
these cases we only use data from the pre-period survey  i.e., we do not rely on variation over
time in the response.
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postcodes, postcode districts do not present a one-to-one relationship with a
TTWA. However, in our sample, around 90% of postcode districts fall into
one TTWA. In order to establish a one-to-one link for the remaining 10% of
postcode districts we use the centroid-distance method. Centroid distances are
computed between any postcode district and TTWA pair, with the former assigned
unilaterally to the latter with the closest centroid.
Finally, the CIS does not provide sampling weights. We construct employment
weights exploiting data from the Business Structure Database Longitudinal,
containing the universe of business organisations in the UK. More speciﬁcally,
employment weights for each ﬁrm i are proportional to the ﬁrm's share of total
employment in the industry s and band b it belongs in 2004:
ωi,b,s = Ei,b,s,2004/Eb,s,2004 (2.11)
We consider ﬁve employment bands (10-20, 20-50, 50-100, 100-250, 250+) and
4-digit 1992 Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes.
2.4.1 EU8 Immigration to the UK
We bring the predictions of the model to the data by exploiting a large shock to the
relative supply of low-skill labour across UK TTWAs in the form of the expansion
of the EU in 2004. The expansion brought in eight Central and Eastern European
countries: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia. Though citizens of these countries were immediately granted free
movement across EU countries, their access to most labour markets was restricted
during a seven-year phase-in period. The exceptions were Ireland, Sweden and
the UK who granted immediate access, the result of which was a large inﬂow of
immigrants into these countries.
Figure 2.2 depicts the long-run trend in immigration to the U.K., where we see
that 2004 represented a signiﬁcant departure from trend. In ﬁgure 2.1 we see
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that this discontinuity is largely driven by the EU-accession-driven inﬂow of EU8
imimmigrants beginning in 2004.
Most important for the purposes of our research design is the fact that the average
hourly wage of EU8 immigrants over the period 2004-2008 was far below that
of the native population1. According to Dustmann, Frattini and Halls [2010]
the average hourly wage over the period 2004-2009 for men from EU8 countries
was ¿6.81 while it was ¿11.91 for native-born men. This suggests that the EU8
expansion signiﬁcantly changed the labour force composition in areas that received
signiﬁcant numbers of these immigrants. To the extent that low-skill natives and
immigrants are imperfectly substitutable, this fall in the average low-skill wage
would have generated a cost saving gain for ﬁrms who employed these workers,
and relatively more so for ﬁrms who used low-skill labour relatively intensively, as
we discussed in the model. Also important is that the magnitude of the inﬂow to
the UK was largely unanticipated. Negotiations for the terms on which the new
countries would enter the EU and enjoy its beneﬁts, including full labour mobility,
concluded only in December 2002 and the most highly publicized report at the
time estimated that the net annual inﬂow from the new countries to the UK would
be 5,000-13,000. These ﬁgures were generated by a UK government commissioned
report a year before the enlargement [Dustmann and Fabbri, 2003]. At the
time of publishing, it was not known with certainty whether Germany would
or would not impose labour controls on the new accession countries, and so the
authors' calculated an estimated extra 20,000-210,000 immigrants for Germany
but emphasized that if Germany maintained labour controls then some of this
expected ﬂow might divert to the UK. The low anticipated ﬂows for the UK were
likely believable for UK ﬁrms, given the historically low inﬂows to the UK and
the stated preference of individuals in the new accession countries to move to
locations closer to home both culturally and linguistically (Germany and Austria
were the top destinations of choice as listed in the Home Oﬃce Report).
1This was despite their higher average education level (see Dustmann, Frattini and Halls
[2010]).
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2.4.2 What is Process Innovation?
The notion of process innovation is typically taken to be one type of organizational
change; speciﬁcally, it usually reﬂects the implementation of more sophisticated
or appropriate production processes in order to increase eﬃciency. Reassuringly,
this is also what respondents to the CIS have in mind. In Table 2.1 we present
the correlation coeﬃcients between the process innovation dummy and indicators
regarding the importance for the ﬁrm of several organizational changes as eﬀects
of the introduced innovations1. In addition we consider ﬁrm's expenditure in
the acquisition of machinery, equipment and software. The latter variable is
included in order to determine whether process innovation is simply a proxy
for capital investments which, as noted above, has been explored in the context
of immigration in other papers. As we can see from the table, while process
innovation is certainly correlated with capital investment, it appears to be a
broader concept than that alone. The strongest correlates with process innovation
are Improvements in Production Flexibility and Improvements in Production
Capacity.
2.5 Speciﬁcations and Identiﬁcation
To bring the model to the data, we exploit the discontinuous inﬂow of immigrants
arising from the 2004 EU8 expansion, described in Section 2.4 above. Formally, we
estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation using OLS regression, the baseline
version of which is the following:




+ αt + γi + iat
(2.12)
1The corresponding question from which these variables are drawn is formulated as following
in the survey questionnaire: How important were each of the following eﬀects of your product
(good or service) and/or process innovations introduced during the three year period ... ?
Where the respondent ﬁrm has to tick one box among "not relevant", "low", "medium",
"high". Given the negative skewness of the variables' distributions, these are reduced to dummy
indicators where a value of 1 indicates "medium" to "high" importance.
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where INN is one of the binary innovation measures of interest, associated
with ﬁrm i located in TTWA a in period t; EU8sharea,2004 is the percentage
share of EU8 immigrants in TTWA a in 2004; and POST is an indicator
equal to 1 for post-2004 periods and 0 for the 2002-2004 period 1 2. Since, in
this speciﬁcation, the right-hand-side variable of interest varies across TTWAs
in the cross-section we cluster standard errors at the TTWA level throughout.
The speciﬁcation includes time period dummies, to control for aggregate shocks
aﬀecting ﬁrms similarly over time, and ﬁrm dummies, to account for all time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity between ﬁrms. The regressor of interest is
POSTt × EU8sharea,2004, whose estimated coeﬃcient gives the eﬀect of the
immigration-induced local labour market shocks due to the European enlargement
on the innovation activity of ﬁrms.
The intuition behind (2.12) is that the ﬁrms most aﬀected by the 2004 EU8
accession will be those located in the TTWAs that experienced the largest
subsequent inﬂow of EU8 immigrants. To capture this feature of each TTWA we
appeal to the ethnic enclave argument most commonly associated with Altonji
and Card [1991] and Card [2001b]. The idea is that immigrant groups tend to
settle in locations in which their compatriots are already settled. As a result,
the pre-existing distribution of a particular immigrant group across locations will
serve as a good predictor of the future pattern of immigrant settlement. In our
case, the share of EU8 immigrants in an area in 2004 should then serve as a useful
predictor of settlement patterns between 2004 and 2008.
In a second set of speciﬁcations we interact the intensity-of-treatment variable
EU8sharea,2004 with pre-period ﬁrm-level measures in order to more fully test the
1Given the very small proportion of EU8 immigrants in the local population before the
European enlargement, EU8sharea,2004 is rescaled in percentage terms to ease the presentation
of the estimated results.
2EU8sharea,2004 is identiﬁed because of a small proportion of ﬁrms (7%) relocating across
local labour markets during the time period of analysis.
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implications of the model. We formally estimate:









+ αt + γi + iat
(2.13)
where Xia,2004 includes relevant ﬁrm-level characteristics in 2002-2004
1.
A potential issue with this approach is that there may be unobserved factors
that are both correlated with the EU8 share in an area in 2004 and, indepen-
dently, with ﬁrm-level innovation in that area, both in 2004 and in subsequent
periods. For instance, productivity shocks that drive immigrants to a particular
area are also likely to increase the innovation intensity of ﬁrms in that area. To
deal with this issue we estimate speciﬁcations (2.12) and (2.13) replacing the 2004
EU8 local share with a predicted share ̂EU8sharea,2004 based on a lagged EU8
share variable, reﬂecting the share of EU8 immigrants in a TTWA in 1991. We
then augment this share by the aggregate growth rate of EU8 immigrant inﬂows
between 1991 and 2004 (1 + gEU8,1991−2004) relative to the UK total population
growth (1 + gUK,1991−2004) :
̂EU8sharea,2004 = EU8sharea,1991 × (1 + gEU8,1991−2004)
(1 + gUK,1991−2004)
(2.14)
The potential endogeneity problem now only arises if, for instance, a productivity
shock that drove EU8 immigrants to an area in 1991 also inﬂuences ﬁrm-level
innovation in that area over the period 2004 to 2008. In other words, if the
hypothetical productivity shock is serially correlated (enough) then this may be
the case, and there may be lingering endogeneity. We rely on the fact that 1991
was distant enough so that the shocks driving immigrants to particular TTWAs
1Note that the pre-period ﬁrm-level terms are absorbed in the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
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in 1991 are very likely to be uncorrelated with the shocks to innovation over the
recent period. At the same time, the 1991 immigrant distribution is predictive of
the 2004 distribution via the persistence in immigrant networks.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 sketch the estimation strategy. The top panel shows the
OLS relationship between the 1991 working age TTWA concentrations of EU8
immigrants and their subsequent 2004 levels. EU8share in 1991 has a 25th
percentile of 0 and a 75th percentile of 0.011. Therefore, an interquartile
diﬀerential in the local share of EU8 immigrants in 1991 corresponds to a 0.16
percentage points increase in the 2004 local share. The exclusion of London
reduces the signiﬁcance of the estimated association but does not relevantly aﬀect
its magnitude. The zero values for the EU8share on the x axis are explained by
the naturally lower presence of this immigrant group as far back as 1991. However,
the sizeable amount of zero values for EU8share on the y axis is indicative of
substantial measurement error in the QLFS. This argument is conﬁrmed in the
bottom panel, where for comparison we replace on the y axis the 2004 TTWA-
level of EU8share with its 2001 values retrieved from the 2001 Census data1.
Figure 2.4 depicts the OLS regression of the endogenous 2004 EU8share on
̂EU8sharea,2004. The estimated relationship shows a coeﬃcient of 0.9 with a t-
statistic of 10, satisfying Staiger and Stock [1997]'s rule of thumb. When London
is excluded, the estimated coeﬃcient does not relevantly change although the t-
statistic value drops to 3.4.
We note that in 2.13, although the ﬁrm-level interaction terms are taken at their
pre-period values, they may still be endogenous to ﬁrm innovation to some extent.
As a result, the estimated relationships will be interpreted as associations. In the
next paragraph we describe each of the ﬁrm-level measures considered.
1We retrieve EU8 immigration data for 2001 census from publicly available data on the ONS
website(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/census/census-2001/data-and-products/data-and-product-catalogue/commissioned-
output/commissioned-tables/index.html). EU8 immigrants' counts are available at district
level. We apply the centroid distance method to produce TTWA-level estimates.
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2.5.1 Skill Heterogeneity, Firm Size and the Role for
Immigrant Demand
We ﬁrst explore the role of the ﬁrm's skill distribution, captured here by the
relative share of employees with a college degree in science or engineering subjects
at the beginning of the period (H/Lia,2004). Since the relevant skill that we are
interested in is the skill required to develop and implement new product or process
innovations, we believe this measure of science and engineering education is an
ideal measure. Here we test the straightforward prediction reﬂected in Lemma 4
that initially low-skill intensive ﬁrms will have greater incentive to increase their
process innovation activities in the face of the low-skill supply shock. With respect
to product innovation Proposition 5 implies that the role of skill in the response
is key. This is because the direction of the eﬀect from channels (1) and (2) are
unchanged in the case of a high-skill labour shock, but channel (3) switches sign.
Thus, under a high-skill labour supply shock the product innovation response is
unambiguously positive, whereas it is ambiguous in the case of a low-skill shock,
the case captured by the Proposition. Second, we test Lemma 3 which states
that the process innovation response to a low-skill labour supply shock should be
increasing in ﬁrm size. Here we proxy ﬁrm size with the log of ﬁrm turnover in
the initial period (LogTurnoveria,2004).
In our ﬁnal speciﬁcation we explore the demand side impact of the labour supply
shock by ﬁrst interacting the treatment intensity variable with an indicator for
whether the ﬁrm sells all of their output locally (Local Salesia,2004)  deﬁned as
within 100 miles of the ﬁrm  and, second, an indicator for whether the ﬁrm
sells all of their output within the UK (UK Salesia,2004). To the extent that
the population increase from the EU8 expansion generates greater demand for
goods and services, and this should promote product innovation as summarized
in channel (2) of Proposition 5.
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2.6 Descriptive Evidence
Before discussing the econometric results we provide descriptive statistics for
relevant variables during the period 2002-2008. Table 2.2 shows that the average
proportion of ﬁrms investing in process innovation decreases over time, registering
an overall drop of about 6 percentage points throughout the whole period.
Also, the average share of ﬁrms investing in product innovation decreases by 4
percentage points. The average capital expenditure of ﬁrms decreases throughout
the period by about 7 log points. The working-age population share of EU8
immigrants consistently increases over time, showing a positive change of 1.09
percentage points. At the same time, the average skill-ratio of ﬁrms decreases.
This is in line with a low-skilled labour supply shock aﬀecting the labour supply
composition of ﬁrm employment by lowering the average skill-intensity. The
average ﬁrm turnover, which we use as a proxy for ﬁrm size, constantly increases
over time. The share of local and UK-wide sales appear to substantially decline
over the period, dropping by 16 and 7 percentage points respectively.
Finally, ﬁgure 2.5 provides TTWA-level evidence by plotting OLS regressions of
the mean change in the share of innovating ﬁrms on the contemporaneous change
in the share of EU8 immigrants throughout the period of analysis. The plots
are clearly only suggestive, but they indicate a negative correlation between the
group of EU8 immigrants and the extent of process and product innovation. On
the one hand, the evidence for process innovation appears in contrast with the
model prediction, according to which the availability of a new set of relatively
cheaper skills should induce a positive reorganization of production processes.
Process innovation may be reduced by the availability of relatively cheaper labour,
opposite to our expectations, or it might be the case that contemporaneous
unobserved factors are, at this stage, co-founding the underlying true relationship
between the two variables. On the other hand, product innovation is negatively
associated with the EU8 immigrant share. This potentially indicates that the
dominant response of ﬁrms to the low-skilled labour shock is to reduce investments
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in this high-skill activity, as it turns relatively more expensive. In the next section
we apply the identiﬁcation strategy to explore these relationships in more detail.
2.7 Results
2.7.1 Process Innovation Estimates
Table 2.3 shows the results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
is a binary indicator for whether the ﬁrm engaged in process innovation during
the 2004-2008 period, noting that the pre-treatment period spans 2002-2004.
Column (1) reports estimates for the baseline regression (2.12). We test whether
β2>0, as from Proposition 2, which states that process innovation is biased toward
the now more abundant factor. This prediction is not conﬁrmed by the data as
the point estimate indicates a negative treatment eﬀect, although not signiﬁcant.
Columns (2) and (3) distinguish between manufacturing and non-tradable 1-digit
industry sectors1. The negative point estimate for the treatment eﬀect appears
somewhat larger in the manufacturing sector although it remains non-signiﬁcant.
In column (4) we proceed with testing Lemma 4, i.e. the low-skill bias of process
innovation, by including the interaction of our treatment variable with the ﬁrm
skill-intensity. The triple interaction term coeﬃcient is negative, indicating that
the treatment is mitigated by the skill content of the ﬁrm, i.e., low-skill intensive
ﬁrms respond less negatively to the treatment. However, the relationship is not
signiﬁcant.
Next, column (5) tests Lemma 3, i.e. whether larger ﬁrms respond relatively
more to the low-skill local labour supply shocks by increasing process innovation.
The inclusion of the triple interaction term turns the coeﬃcient of the
treatment variable positive, albeit with a magnitude centered around 0. The
triple interaction coeﬃcient indicates a signiﬁcantly negative and substantial
association. The larger the pre-period size of treated ﬁrms, the less their
1The non-tradable sector includes: energy and water, construction, distribution , hotel,
restaurants, transport and communication, ﬁnance, insurance and restaurants.
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investment in process innovation after the EU enlargement. This ﬁnding contrasts
with our prediction in Lemma 3 and suggests a stronger substitution away for
bigger ﬁrms from process innovation activities.
As a robustness check for the negative association between EU8 immigration
and process innovation we investigate in table 2.4 the treatment eﬀect on each
correlate with process innovation. The estimated eﬀects are negative although
not signiﬁcant on almost all the outcomes, conﬁrming the main ﬁndings. The
only signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect is found on production ﬂexibility, where the point
estimate of -0.11 indicates an interquartile diﬀerential eﬀect of EU8share of about
0.05 percentage points.
The empirical evidence gives contradictory results with respect to our model
predictions. Let us recall that the treatment eﬀect suﬀers from downward bias
given that any response by ﬁrms from May through December of 2004 due to the
immediate inﬂow of immigrants from EU8 countries is allocated to the pre-period.
However, we do ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient, even if not signiﬁcant.
We rationalize this ﬁnding with the hypothesis that British ﬁrms might have found
the cost of process innovation larger than the beneﬁt of cheaper low-skill labour
input. Low-skill immigration might therefore be substitute to process innovation,
in the same way it is to capital investments as found in the literature [Lewis, 2011].
This would imply a negative eﬀect of EU8 immigration on process innovation.
Another important consideration is that the UK, as many other developed
countries has been experiencing a process of technological change ongoing since
at least the 1980s (see for example Autor and Dorn [2013] for the US; Goos and
Manning [2007], Salvatori [2015] for the UK]. In particular, the Routine Biased
Technical Change hypothesis [Autor et al., 2003] states that continuously cheaper
computerization progressively replaces human labour in routine tasks leading to a
polarization of the skill-employment distribution. This implies that the estimated
treatment eﬀects might suﬀer from endogenous bias due to unobserved technology
shocks correlated with EU8sharea,1991. Montresor [2016] the Chapter 3 of this
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thesis investigates the job polarization of UK local labour markets during the two-
decade period 1993-2013. The author provides evidence on the negative eﬀect of
technological exposure on the local employment of less-skilled workers in the UK.
Local labour markets that historically specialized in routine-intensive industries
registered the highest decline in the employment of non-graduate labour. Given
the skill-bias of technological adoption, ﬁrms that undertook capital investment to
replace less-skilled workers before the European enlargement immigration shock,
would most likely not ﬁnd it optimal to absorb the inﬂows of cheaper low-
skill labour. In this sense, our theoretical model would predict at best the
adjustment of ﬁrms that pre-European enlargement were labour intensive. It
appears important to test the model distinguishing by capital/labour intensity of
ﬁrms. Unfortunately, we currently lack the necessary data for this analysis and
therefore leave it to future work.
2.7.2 Product Innovation Estimates
Table 2.5 shows the results from OLS regressions in which the dependent variable
denotes whether the ﬁrm engaged in product innovation.
Column (1) reports estimates for the baseline regression (2.12). Proposition
5 states that the eﬀect of the labour supply shock on product innovation is
ambiguous, and depends on: (1) the relative strength of the cost saving gains
associated with EU8 immigrants (arising from the fall in the local average low-
skill wage) and, (3) the extent of substitution away from product innovation due
to its high-skill intensity (due to the rise in the relative high-skill wage). We
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and negative average treatment eﬀect. This suggests that the
substitution eﬀect (channel 3) is dominant in ﬁrms' response to the low skill
labour supply shock. Let us recall that the Iqr for ̂EU8share in 2004 is 0.46.
The point estimate for the treatment variable indicates that ﬁrms starting at
the 75th percentile of ̂EU8share in 2004, decrease their product innovation by
0.016 percentage points more that ﬁrms at the 25th percentile. Importantly, when
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distinguishing between manufacturing and non-tradable sectors in columns (2)
and (3), the treatment eﬀect appears signiﬁcant and negative only for the latter.
Furthermore, in the manufacturing sector the point estimate for EU8share is
centered around 0. In the next columns we therefore focus on the non-tradable
sector and we interact the treatment variable with pre-period ﬁrm characteristics.
The estimated associations for the triple interaction terms are never signiﬁcant.
In column (4) the coeﬃcient of the interaction terms between our treatment
variable and ﬁrm skill intensity is negative indicating that more skill-intensive
treated ﬁrms in 2004 are more negatively associated with the probability of
investing in product innovation after the EU enlargement.
The negative coeﬃcient of the triple interaction with ﬁrm size in column (5)
complements the previous empirical ﬁndings for process innovation, showing that
bigger ﬁrms are associated with a relative higher decrease in product innovation.
Finally, columns (6) and (7) ask whether the treatment eﬀect is increasing in the
extent to which the ﬁrm sells their output locally (within 100 miles) or within the
UK borders (channel). Both triple interaction coeﬃcients indicate positive, albeit
non signiﬁcant associations.
In summary, on average the product innovation activity of British ﬁrms seems
to have suﬀered from EU8 immigration, except for the manufacturing sector.
We interpret the negative treatment eﬀect as a sign of ﬁrms' reduced eﬀort in a
typically high-skill activity which becomes relatively more expensive due to the
low-skill labour supply shock. No diﬀerential treatment associations are found on
the basis of ﬁrm skill-intensity, ﬁrm size and ﬁrm domestic market size.
2.8 Conclusions
With various countries, including the UK, considering tightening their immigra-
tion policies, it is particularly relevant to measure the entire impact immigrants
have on host country economies. Innovation is a key understudied area with
potentially large implications for the host economy performance in the longer
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run. This paper focuses on within ﬁrm-adjustments to labour supply shocks. We
provide a novel contribution to the literature by considering innovation as an
alternative mechanism ﬁrms use to absorb skill-speciﬁc changes in local labour
supply. When the ﬁrm adjusts the relative eﬃciency of its inputs we refer to
this as process innovation, and when the ﬁrm endogenously chooses its optimal
product scope, we refer to it as product innovation. Accordingly, we develop a
model with heterogeneous proﬁt-maximising ﬁrms choosing their optimal product
scope and their optimal production structure, respectively. On the one hand, the
model predicts that a low-skill labour supply shock has a clear positive eﬀect on
the process innovation activity of ﬁrms and operates through a greater incentive
to use more intensively the now available more abundant and relatively cheaper
labour production input. Furthermore, this eﬀect is increasing in the ﬁrm's low-
skill intensity and output. On the other hand, the model states that the eﬀect of
the low-skill supply shock on the product innovation activity of ﬁrms is instead
ambiguous and depends on the interaction of three channels. More speciﬁcally,
the supply of relatively cheaper labour supply reduces the ﬁrm's production costs,
thereby increasing product scope. This positive eﬀect is increasing in the size of
the market. However, the relative increase in the supply of low-skill labour makes
the high-skill product innovation activity more costly, and ﬁrms may be incen-
tivized to substitute away from it.
We bring the model to the data and test its hypotheses by exploring the prod-
uct and process innovation responses to the large inﬂux of EU8 immigrants to
the U.K. since the enlargement of the European Union in 2004. Two main ﬁnd-
ings emerge from the empirical analysis. Firstly, we detect a negative albeit not
signiﬁcant average eﬀect of low-skill labour supply shocks on the process inno-
vation of ﬁrms. Furthermore, when distinguishing across heterogeneous ﬁrms, a
further contradictory result is that bigger treated ﬁrms appear associated with a
relatively stronger immigration-induced decrease in their investment in process in-
novation with respect to smaller ones. The negative association between the local
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EU8 immigration inﬂows and ﬁrm process innovation is conﬁrmed in a robustness
check where ﬁrm correlates with process innovation are used as outcome variables.
We hypothesize that, similarly to capital investment, process innovation might be
gross substitute to low-skill immigration. In line with this reasoning, British ﬁrms
might have found the cost of process innovation larger than the beneﬁt of cheaper
low-skill labour input. Furthermore, we acknowledge the importance of account-
ing for technological shocks which are likely to generate endogeneity bias in our
treatment estimates. Given the skill-bias of technological adoption, ﬁrms that
undertook capital investment to replace less-skilled workers before the European
enlargement immigration shock, will not ﬁnd it optimal to absorb the inﬂows of
cheaper low-skill labour. As regards product innovation, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
and negative average treatment eﬀect. According to our model predictions, this
suggests that the dominant response of ﬁrms has been to substitute away from a
now relatively more costly high-skill activity. However, the empirical limits of our
analysis advocate for future work.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Correlates with Process
Innovation
Variable ρ
Improve product quality 0.13
Improve production flexibility 0.16
Improve production capacity 0.16
Reduce per unit costs 0.10
Improve health and safety 0.08
Increase value added 0.11
Log(capital expenditure) 0.07
Notes: The table shows the correlation coeﬃ-
cients between the process innovation dummy
and indicators for the ﬁrm of several organi-
zational changes as eﬀects of the introduced
innovations as well as with capital expenditure.
The corresponding question from which the
organizational change variables are drawn is
formulated as following in the survey question-
naire: How important were each of the following
eﬀects of your product (good or service) and/or
process innovations introduced during the three
year period ... ? Where the respondent ﬁrm
has to tick one box among "not relevant",
"low", "medium", "high". Given the negative
skewness of the variables' distributions, these
are reduced to dummy indicators where a value
of 1 indicates "medium" to "high" importance.
Capital expenditure represents ﬁrm's invest-
ments (,000 ¿) in the acquisition of machin-
ery, equipment and software. Log(capital
expenditure) is measured with the follow-
ing monotonic transformation Log(capital
expenditure + 1). 25% of observations have 0
value for capital expenditure.
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Table 2.2: Decriptive Statistics
2002-2004 2006-2008 2002-2008
Mean 25p 75p Mean 25p 75p ∆ Mean ∆ Iqr
Process 0.21 0.15 -0.06
Product 0.29 0.25 -0.04
Log(Capital expenditure) 0.18 0.00 0.14 0.10 0 0.05 -0.07 -0.09
EU8share (%) 0.3 0 0.43 1.39 0.4 2.28 1.09 1.45
̂EU8share (%) 0.68 0.37 0.83
HL 0.14 0 0.03 0.09 0 0.02 -0.05 -0.01
LogTurnover 1.62 0.22 2.91 1.89 0.41 3.22 0.27 0.12
Local Sales 0.29 0.13 -0.16
UK Sales 0.22 0.16 -0.07
Notes: The table shows mean, 25th and 75th percentiles values of
relevant variables in every wave of the sample, as well as the respective
mean and interquartile changes throughout the whole period.
Process and Product are dummy indicators for whether the ﬁrm
engaged in either innovation type. Capital expenditure represents
ﬁrm's investments (,000 ¿) in the acquisition of machinery, equipment
and software. Log(Capital expenditure) is measured with the following
monotonic transformation Log(Capital expenditure + 1). 25% of
observations have 0 value for Capital expenditure. EU8 share is the
percentage share of EU8 immigrants; ̂EU8share is the predicted share
of EU8 immigrants computed from 1991 Census levels, augmented by
the aggregate growth rate of EU8 immigrant inﬂows relative to the UK
total population between 1991 and 2004. HL is the relative share of
employees with a college degree in science and engineering subjects.
Turnover is ﬁrm's turnover (,000 ¿). Local Sales and UK Sales are
dummy variables indicating, respectively, whether the ﬁrm sells their
output locally (within 100 miles of the enterprise) and nationally.
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Table 2.3: Process Innovation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Manufacturing Non-tradable All All
̂EU8sharea,2004 -0.011 0.055 -0.042 -0.015 -0.015
(0.061) (0.134) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063)
Post ∗ ̂EU8sharea,2004 -0.024 -0.049 -0.015 -0.021 0.005
(0.020) (0.055) (0.018) (0.021) (0.033)
Post ∗ ̂EU8sharea,2004 ∗H/Lt -0.021
(0.018)
Post ∗ ̂EU8sharea,2004 ∗ LogTurnovert -0.270***
(0.092)
N 8552 2701 5851 8319 8322
R2 0.525 0.530 0.52 0.520 0.521
Notes: The dependent variable is Process, dummy indicator for whether the ﬁrm engaged
in process innovation. Results are show for all, manufacturing and non-tradable (1-
digit industry) ﬁrms. The non-tradable sector includes: energy and water, construction,
distribution, hotel, restaurants, transport and communication, ﬁnance, insurance and
restaurants. All speciﬁcations include intercept, time and ﬁrm dummies. Standard errors
in parentheses are clustered by TTWA. Observations are weighted by ﬁrm's employment
share in the relative band and industry sector. Recall that EU8share is measured in %
terms.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent
level.
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Table 2.4: Process Innovation Correlates
Improve Improve Improve Reduced Improve Increase Log
product production production per unit health & value (capital
quality ﬂexibility capacity costs safety added expenditure)
̂EU8sharea,2004 0.046 0.104 0.086 0.055 -0.079 -0.022 0.155
(0.057) (0.121) (0.115) (0.079) (0.104) (0.078) (0.197)
Post ∗ ̂EU8sharea,2004 -0.026 -0.065 -0.109* -0.061 0.059 0.030 -0.019
(0.060) (0.052) (0.049) (0.042) (0.068) (0.043) (0.069)
N 2911 2632 2528 2542 1901 2804 4938
R2 0.693 0.712 0.724 0.729 0.869 0.714 0.662
Notes: The dependent variables are correlates with process innovatin (see table 2.1). All speciﬁ-
cations include intercept, time and ﬁrm dummies. Observations are weighted by the pre-period
ﬁrm relative share of total employment in its industry employment band. Standard errors are
clustered by TTWA. Recall that EU8share is measured in % terms.
Log(Capital expenditure) is measured with the following monotonic transformation
Log(Capital expenditure + 1). 25% of observations have 0 value for Capital expenditure.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.1: EU8 Immigrants as a Share (%) of the UK Working-age Population,
2004-2013
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the the percentage share of EU8 immigrants as a ratio
to the working age population in the UK by quarter during 2002-2008.
Figure 2.2: Long-term International Migration of EU citizens, UK, 1975-2013
Source: Oﬃce for National Statistics [2014] (Figure 1).
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the long-term migration estimates or EU citizens.
Estimates are newvisional for the year ending December 2013.
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Figure 2.3: Estimation Strategy (1)
Notes: The top panels plot the ﬁtted lines from OLS regressions of the 2004 EU8 immigrant percentage
share on the respective 1991 levels, with and without London TTWA. The bottom panels plot the ﬁtted
lines from OLS regressions of the 2001 EU8 immigrant percentage share on the respective 1991 levels, with
and without London TTWA. The 2004 share is computed from QLFS data, while the 2001 and 1991 shares
are computed from Census data.
Observations are weighted by the pre-period ﬁrm relative share of total employment in its industry
employment band. Standard errors are clustered by TTWA. The total number of TTWAs is 151.
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Figure 2.4: Estimation Strategy (2)
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the ﬁtted lines from OLS regression of the 2004
EU8 immigrant percentage share on the respective predicted 2004 levels,
with and without London. The predicted levels are based on 1991 Census
levels, augmented by the aggregate growth rate of EU8 immigrant inﬂows
relative to the UK total population between 1991 and 2004. Observations
are weighted by the pre-period ﬁrm relative share of total employment in its
industry employment band. Standard errors are clustered by TTWA. The
total number of TTWAs is 151.
Figure 2.5: Change in Innovation vs Change in EU8 Immigrants across TTWAs,
2004-2008
Notes: The ﬁgure plots OLS regressions of the mean changes in the share
of innovating ﬁrms in process (left) and product (right) innovation on the
contemporaneous change in the share of EU8 immigrants throughout the
period. Observations are weighted by the pre-period ﬁrm relative share of
total employment in its industry employment band. Standard errors are
clustered by TTWA. The total number of TTWAs is 151.
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Chapter 3
Job Polarization and Labour Supply
Changes in the UK
Abstract
During the past two decades, the UK has experienced dramatic changes in the
composition of its labour force, mainly due to a rapid educational upgrading and
immigration surges. Over the same period, unlike the US, the UK has shown a
persistent pattern of occupational polarization. This paper provides ﬁrst empirical
evidence on the causal eﬀect of technological exposure on local labour markets in the
UK. The analysis combines 1993-2013 QLFS data with a longitudinal Census sample
spanning 1971-2011. The identiﬁcation strategy exploits geographical variation across
local labour markets stemming from their historical specialization in routine-intensive
activities. Results conﬁrm the leading role of technology in hollowing out middle
paid jobs and pushing the reallocation of less skilled workers to the bottom of the
employment distribution. However, no signiﬁcant eﬀect of technological exposure is
found on skilled non-routine cognitive employment. At the same time, higher start-of-
the-period local relative graduate labour supply is signiﬁcantly negatively associated
with top employment growth during the 1990s, in coincidence with the substantial
increase in the pool of graduates. In line with this last ﬁnding, the analysis of individual
occupational transitions uncovers a marked increase in the outﬂows of both graduates
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and non-graduates from the top down the occupational ladder since 1991.
Key Words: Job Polarization, Labour Supply Changes, Local Labour Markets,
Occupational Mobility
JEL Codes: J21, J23, J24, O33
3.1 Introduction
The demographic composition of the labour force in the UK in the last two decades
has changed dramatically, mainly reﬂecting a rapid educational upgrading and
surging immigrant inﬂows. Figure 3.1 shows the shares of graduates and of immi-
grants among employees between 1979 and 2012. The plot shows that both shares
have started to accelerate signiﬁcantly during the 1990s, more than doubling be-
tween 1990 and 2012.
Over the same period a growing number of studies have documented the polar-
ization of employment across a number of developed countries [see for example
Autor and Dorn [2013] for the US; Goos and Manning [2007], Salvatori [2015] for
the UK; Goos et al. [2014], Michaels et al. [2014] for Europe].
In the seminal paper of Autor et al. [2003] (ALM henceforth) job polarization is
explained through the so called routinization or routine-biased technical change
(RBTC) hypothesis, stating that continuously cheaper computerization progres-
sively replaces human labour in routine tasks, thereby leading to an increase in
the relative demand for workers performing non-routine tasks.
The prevailing economic literature has so far provided empirical support to this
hypothesis [Autor and Dorn, 2013; Goos and Manning, 2007; Goos et al., 2014;
Michaels et al., 2014].
Nevertheless, while this thesis seems to ﬁt well the US employment distribution
during the 1990s, it falls short in explaining a number of recent empirical puzzles
that emerged since the year 2000. Major pitfalls are the unexplained downturn in
the growth of high-skilled occupations and the disappearance of wage polarization
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[Autor, 2015; Beaudry et al., 2016]. In particular, as regards the deceleration of
employment growth in top occupations, Autor [2015] suggests that high-skill jobs
may not be growing enough to absorb the increasing supply of educated workers.
A recent study from Salvatori [2015] raises doubts on the leading role of technology
while highlights the contribution of changes in the structure of the labour supply
in explaining the job polarization phenomenon in the UK. The author shows how
the UK distinguishes itself from the US counterpart in two main features: the per-
sistent polarized shape of the employment distribution since at least the 1980s,
with growth in high skilled occupations always by far exceeding that in bottom
ones, and the absence of wage polarization in any decade.
In light of the emerging literature debate, the UK oﬀers an interesting context
for testing the causal eﬀect of exposure to technological change. On the policy
side, understanding the determinants of job polarization can advice policy mak-
ers in designing policies to best promote a sustainable economic growth. This is
especially salient given the wide-spreading feeling of technological anxiety [Mokyr
et al., 2015]. The changing structure of the labour market raises important policy
challenges in terms of job quality and occupational mobility. On the one hand,
middling workers facing loss of their jobs are most likely to look towards lower-
paying jobs. On the other hand, the decline in middle-pay jobs can undermine
the chances of the low-paid workers of moving up the occupational ladder.
This paper provides new evidence on employment polarization in the UK. The
aim is to disentangle the causal eﬀect of technological exposure while providing
suggestive evidence on the role of labour supply changes in shaping the polarized
structure of employment during the last two decades (1993-2013).
The empirical strategy builds on the spatial analysis approach of Autor and Dorn
[2013] and exploits geographical variation across local labour markets in their his-
torical specialization in routine-intensive industries to identify the causal eﬀect
of technological exposure on employment changes. Employment data is derived
from the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) and local labour markets are
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proxied by Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs), statistical units developed by the
Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS) for the speciﬁc purpose to bound commuting
zones. The construction of time-consistent local labour markets is based on the
novel use of geographical weights mapping wards to TTWAs. The use of TTWAs
as measures of local labour markets is validated by the unresponsive mobility of
the working-age population to technological exposure observed across these ar-
eas. The endogeneity of technology exposure is addressed with an instrumental
variables strategy that relies on variation obtained from the industrial and em-
ployment mix across TTWA observed in the Census for England and Wales in the
year 1971, about a decade before the boom in workplace computerization [Autor
et al., 1998; Bresnahan, 1999; Nordhaus, 2007]. The study is complemented by
the use of longitudinal Census data spanning 1971-2011 in order to provide a ﬁner
insight into employment changes.
The econometric analysis conﬁrms the fundamental role of technology in shap-
ing the hollowed out structure of employment. Local labour markets that were
initially specialised in routine intensive occupations exhibit larger declines in non-
graduate routine employment, with its reallocation to non-routine manual oc-
cupations. However, no eﬀect of technological exposure is found on skilled top
occupational employment changes. This evidence may indicate that the growing
pool of graduates may have out-weighted the demand for skills.
Because of the rapid educational catch-up, higher start-of-the-period local human
capital is in fact negatively associated with employment growth in graduate non-
routine cognitive occupations during the 1990s. High-skilled immigrant concen-
trations are instead positively associated with graduate top employment growth
in both decades. At the bottom, initial local labour supply factors do not show
any relevant signiﬁcance. However, graduate labour supply changes appear neg-
atively related with growth in non-routine manual occupations in both decades
and the magnitude of this association grows over time. This set of results provides
supportive evidence of a mere supply-side eﬀect of the educational upgrading of
76
the population.
Finally, the analysis of individuals' occupational transitions uncovers a marked
occupational downgrading since the 1990s and quantitatively aﬀecting non-
graduates twice as much as graduates. The suggestive evidence is that there
are two major forces at play: the decline in routinization explains the hollowing
out of the employment distribution, while the raising supply of graduates increases
job competition along the employment distribution.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant eco-
nomic literature, section 3.3 describes the data sources, the deﬁnition of local
labour markets and the routine intensity measure. Section 3.4 presents descrip-
tive evidence on employment polarization by occupational, demographic groups
and by labour market area. Section 3.5 speciﬁes the estimation strategy and
section 3.6 discusses the empirical results. Section 3.7 analyses individual occu-
pational transitions. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The ALM thesis predicts that technological change is biased toward replacing hu-
man labour in routine tasks, while leading to an increase in the relative demand
for workers performing non-routine tasks. Routine tasks are deﬁned as limited
and well-deﬁned activities which can be accomplished by following a set of rules
and therefore are more easily codiﬁable to be executed by machines. These are
typical of many middle-paid cognitive and manual jobs, such as bookkeeping,
clerical work, repetitive production and monitoring. At the opposite ends of the
occupational-skill distribution lie non-routine abstract and manual tasks. The
former are typically performed by high-skilled workers such as managers, profes-
sionals as they require activities such as intuition, creativity, problem-solving. The
latter refer to activities requiring physical dexterity or interpersonal communica-
tion, that are instead typical of low-skilled occupations, such as transportation,
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cleaning, meal preparation, personal care.
Technology substitutes for labour in routine tasks while complements it in non-
routine abstract tasks. Non-routine manual tasks are instead not directly aﬀected
by technology. However, these are subject to general equilibrium eﬀects. Autor
and Dorn [2013] explain the growth of low-skilled service occupations through the
interaction of two forces: on the one hand technological progress replacing low-
skilled labour in routine occupations, while on the other hand, consumer pref-
erences favouring variety over specialization such that goods cannot substitute
services. The authors use repeated cross-sectional data from the US Census and
Current Population Survey (CPS) and identify the eﬀect of technological expo-
sure on local labour markets exploiting variation in the degree of local historical
specialization in routine-intensive occupations. Results show RBTC-consistent
greater decrease in routine employment and greater increase in service employ-
ment in historically routine-intensive areas. Beyond routine-intensity, Autor and
Dorn [2013] have considered alternative hypotheses of job polarization, i.e. the
increasing relative supply share of graduates and of low skilled immigrants, the
aging of the population and the growing oﬀshorability of job tasks. Many of these
explanatory factors receive empirical support but none of them appears to play a
leading role.
Cortes [2016] uses individual-level panel data from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID) for the period 1976-2007 and focuses on testing the RBTC eﬀect
by looking at the occupational transition patterns and wage changes of routine
workers over 2-year windows. The study shows that since the 1990s routine work-
ers become more likely to switch to either non-routine cognitive or manual jobs.
In particular, there is strong evidence of selection on ability, with low-ability rou-
tine workers more likely to reallocate to non-routine manual jobs and high-ability
routine workers more likely to move upward into non-routine cognitive jobs. This
U-shape pattern is not found in non-routine occupational categories. Also, the
wage premium for stayers in routine occupations has signiﬁcantly fallen with re-
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spect to non-routine occupations. This evidence is interpreted as supporting the
RBTC hypothesis.
In the UK, the ﬁrst evidence on job polarization has been provided by Goos and
Manning [2007]. The study uses repeated cross-sectional data from the Labour
Force Survey (LFS) and looks at the period 1979-1999. A conterfactual exercise
tests the routinization hypothesis against changes in the composition of the labour
force, i.e. the increasing employment of women, of graduates, and the changing
age structure in the labour market. The authors conclude that the routinization
hypothesis provides the most plausible explanation for the polarized shape of the
employment distribution.
Goos et al. [2014] and Akcomak et al. [2013] investigate the role of routinization
and oﬀshoring for Europe and the UK respectively. Both factors contribute in ex-
plaining employment changes, although routinization has a much more substantial
eﬀect.
More recently, Salvatori [2015] complements and extends the analysis of Goos and
Manning [2007] up to 2012. The contribution of compositional changes in shaping
the employment structure is assessed using a shift-share decomposition analysis
where the labour force is divided into education-age-immigration-gender cells. Re-
sults indicate that the most distinctive feature of the UK labour market is the
increase in the share of graduates that has accounted for the reallocation from mid-
dling to top occupations in each decade. In parallel, median wages of high-skilled
workers has progressively deteriorated reaching the lowest growth across the em-
ployment distribution. Furthermore, the loss in middling occupations during this
30-year span is entirely experienced by non-graduates, who mostly appeared to
reallocate to the lower tail of the distribution. Finally, also graduates have been
sustaining employment growth in bottom occupations, but only during the 2000s
their contribution exceeded that of non-graduates for the ﬁrst time. Immigrants
also started to play a more important role in the last decade and appear employed
in all three categories, with larger contribution at the extremes. This study sug-
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gests that changes in the structure of the labour supply in the UK could play a
much more important role than what previously considered by the literature.
The demographic composition of the labour force in the UK in the last two decades
has in fact changed dramatically, mainly reﬂecting a rapid educational upgrading
and surging immigrant inﬂows. As Salvatori [2015] points out, while these labour
force changes might be partly endogenously driven by changes in demand, they
are likely to have been largely aﬀected by important institutional changes.
Until the mid-1980s, the UK was particularly lagging behind other OECD coun-
tries in terms of educational achievement. Since then, successive governments
have pursued the objective to improve educational standards [Machin and Vi-
gnoles, 2006]. In part, this was achieved with the introduction of the General
Certiﬁcate of Secondary Education (GCSE) in 1988, which switched the grading
method from norm-referencing to criteria referencing, thereby increasing the
proportion of pupils achieving higher grades and potentially enrolling in higher
education [Bolton, 2012]. Another relevant reform was the abolition of the so
called binary divide between polytechnic institutions and universities in 1992,
granting university status to 48 polytechnics and therefore widening the available
university places. As a result, the participation rate in higher education increased
sharply from 19.3% in 1990 to 33% in 2000 [Bolton, 2012; Salvatori, 2015].
In addition, the UK has started to experience large ﬂows of immigration since late
1990s. In 1997 the incoming labour government shifted from a strict immigration
policy limited to asylum and family reunion to considering immigrants as a re-
source and thereby favouring economic immigration. Further on 1st May 2004,
the UK was one among very few countries in Europe (i.e. Ireland and Sweden)
that opened the doors to new EU member states' citizens (Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). Immigration to the
UK unexpectedly skyrocketed. The Worker Registration Scheme (workers from
A8 countries were required to register on this scheme within a month of joining
a new employer) concluded in 2011 with nearly 1,1 million applications [Home
80
Oﬃce, 2009, 2011].
Salvatori [2015] highlights the contribution of labour supply changes while chal-
lenging the leading role of technological exposure. Indeed, the main challenge in
disentangling the eﬀect of labour supply changes from technology is the embedded
relationship between the two. This paper focuses on isolating the causal eﬀect of
technological exposure on employment, while trying to provide some suggestive
evidence on the role of labour supply changes. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst study which investigates the causal eﬀect of technological exposure
on the UK local labour markets. Another important contribution is the use of
longitudinal information on individuals' occupational transitions which allows to
provide more disaggregated evidence on the evolution of the UK skill-employment
distribution.
3.3 Data Sources and Measurement
The main data source comes from the UK Quaterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS)
and covers the two-decade period 1993-2013. The QLFS represents the pri-
mary source of labour market statistics for the UK including a wide range of
employment-related and demographic information. The QLFS is a household sur-
vey conducted by the Oﬃce for National Statistics (ONS). It comprises a single-
stage sample of households, implicitly stratiﬁed by geographical ordering. Since
1992 it has a quarterly frequency and a rotating panel structure such that each
individual is staying in the sample for ﬁve consecutive quarters. Each quarter
covers approximately 100,000 individuals, making up about 0.2% of the UK pop-
ulation. Only individuals at their ﬁrst interview in each quarter are retained. In
addition, I boost the sample size by pooling together 1993-1994, 2003-2004 and
2013-2014 waves. I make use of the available personal weights to make the sample
representative of the UK population and to correct for non-response.
The analysis is complemented by a random longitudinal data sample from the ONS
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Longitudinal Study (LS). The LS includes a complete set of individual records
linked between successive censuses during 1971-2011. The sample is composed of
people born on one of four selected dates of birth, covering about 1% of the total
population of England and Wales.
Occupations in the QLFS and LS were originally coded according to either the
UK Classiﬁcation of Occupations or Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (CO70,
CO80, SOC-90, SOC-2000 and SOC-2010). I reclassify occupations according
to the International Standard Classiﬁcation of Occupations (ISCO-88) and use
probabilistic matching to create concordance across occupational codes over time.
Occupations are deﬁned at the two-digit level. Armed forces and agriculture-
related occupations are excluded from the sample (ISCO 10, 61 and 92). An
extra number of occupations (ISCO 11, 23, 44, 99) are dropped in order to match
the data to routine and oﬀ-shoring measures from the literature1. The sample of
analysis is composed of employees in paid work aged between 16 and 64 in Eng-
land and Wales. Employment is measured as total usual weekly hours multiplied
by 52 calendar weeks. Hourly wages are measured as gross earnings over average
total paid hours during the reference week.
The spatial units of analysis are local labour markets which are proxied by
TTWAs. These are generated by the ONS, such that at least 75 percent of an
areas' resident workforce live and work in the same area. I refer to the 2007 deﬁ-
nition, according to which in England and Wales there is a total of 186 TTWAs.
I construct time-consistent local labour market areas through the novel use of
geographical weights mapping wards to TTWAs2.
Technology exposure is measured by specialization in routine-intensive occupa-
tions with the Routine Task Intensity (RTI) index. This index was ﬁrst proposed
by ALM, who use the 1977 US Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational
1As discussed in more detail later, I retrieve routine-intensity and oﬀshoring measures from
Goos et al. [2014].
2 There is a highly unique matching rate (above 96%) between wards and TTWAs.
Geographical weights are created for wards overlapping with more than one TTWA. These
are proportional to the area share of the ward falling in each TTWA it overlaps with.
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Titles (DOT) to deﬁne the routine, abstract and manual task content of occu-
pations. This information is merged to occupational data to provide a summary
index increasing in the routine task importance and decreasing in the non-routine
manual and abstract task importance. The index formula, applied to the sample
base year 1993 is as follows:
RTIk = ln(T
R
k,1993)− ln(TMk,1993)− ln(TAk,1993) (3.1)
where TRk,t0 , T
M
k,t0
, TAk,t0 are the routine, manual and abstract task components for
occupation k in 1993.
As previously mentioned, I adopt the RTI classiﬁcation from Goos et al. (2014),
who use the same RTI index constructed by Autor and Dorn (2013) based on the
ALM DOT task measures. The authors map the RTI index from the US census
nomenclature to ISCO-88 and then standardize it across 2-digit occupational
codes. Following Autor and Dorn (2013), I then measure routine-intensity within
TTWAs by classifying as routine those occupations in the highest employment-
weighted third share of the RTI measure in 1993. Accordingly, table 3.1 shows
the 1993 employment distribution ranked from high to low RTI values and shows
the occupational mix representing the set of routine-intensive occupations in the










Where Ljkt is employment in occupation k in TTWA j at time t, 1[.] is the
indicator function taking value of one if routine intensive. The grand mean of




3.4.1 Employment Polarization by Occupational Groups
Previous studies document a clear job polarization pattern for the UK, Goos and
Manning [2007] for the period 1979 to 1999 and Salvatori [2015] for the period
1979 to 2009.
Figure 3.2 shows the changes in employment shares during the period 1993-2013.
Occupations are grouped into employment-weighted deciles of the 1993 wage dis-
tribution. The ﬁgure shows the typical U-shaped pattern of employment polariza-
tion with greatest growth at the top of the distribution, conﬁrming the literature's
ﬁndings.
Table 3.2 shows the levels and changes in employment shares by major occu-
pational groups (2-digit level) in England and Wales between 1993 and 2013.
Occupational groups are ranked by average log hourly wages. We can observe the
polarization pattern with middle-paying occupations exhibiting relative declining
shares with respect to the top and the bottom. The last column shows the RTI in-
dex measure from Goos et al. (2014). The categories experiencing higher growth
among top occupations are corporate managers (+2.65pp) and physical, math-
ematical and engineering science professionals (+1.66pp). Bottom occupational
categories represent a mixture of service and sales-related jobs. We can observe
that bottom employment growth (+4.59pp) is driven by personal and protec-
tive service workers (+3.82pp). The middle occupations registering the highest
employment losses are machine operators and assemblers (-3.07pp); oﬃce clerks
(-2.64pp); metal, machinery and related trade workers (-2.43pp).
Importantly, the polarization trend is not unique to the manufacturing industry.
Table 3.12 in the Appendix shows that occupational categories losing the most are
machine operators, assemblers and craft related ones in the manufacturing sector
while oﬃce clerks in the non-manufacturing one. This is in line with evidence from
Autor et al. (2015) for the US, and suggests the pervasive computerization across
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the economic sectors. The last column of table 2 reports the RTI values, which
appear generally consistent with the polarization pattern. The highest positive
values are associated to middle-ranked occupations. Occupations at the top are
more intense in the abstract task dimension and show negative RTI values, while
at the bottom the values are either negative or near zero. The occupational cat-
egories in bold are deﬁned as routine-intensive following the criteria from Autor
and Dorn (2013) as explained in section 3.3. Finally, I deﬁne the occupations in
the top category as non-routine cognitive, while the remaining occupations in the
bottom category as non-routine manual.
3.4.2 Employment Polarization by Demographic Groups
Figure 3.3 shows changes in employment shares in each decade between 1993
and 2013 for graduates and non-graduate workers by major occupational groups,
ranked by average log hourly wages. Graduates represent workers with a de-
gree or higher educational qualiﬁcation; non-graduates are divided into GCE A
level, GCSE educational qualiﬁcations, other qualiﬁcations and no qualiﬁcations.
The plots show that the categories experiencing employment losses in the middle-
paying jobs are non-graduates. This negative change is partly counterbalanced
by an increase of non-graduate employment in low-paying occupational groups.
Graduate workers have instead gained employment shares along the whole oc-
cupational distribution, but in larger magnitude at the top and bottom. It is
important to point out that this classiﬁcation does not capture immigrants as the
UK QLFS until 2010 included foreign educational qualiﬁcations in other qual-
iﬁcations. Figure 3.4 breaks down employment share changes by immigration
status. Only the employment distribution of native workers appears polarized,
accounting for the entire decline in middle-paying occupations. Immigrants pos-
itively contribute in all major occupational groups, with higher presence at the
two extremes of the distribution. During the 2000s the contribution of immigrants
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to employment growth at the extremes overcomes that of natives.
For completion in ﬁgure 3.5 I replicate the same analysis distinguishing by gen-
der. The polarization phenomenon does not seem to be gender-speciﬁc as both
men and women lose employment share in middle occupations while gain at the
extremes. However, the redistribution of employment between the two groups is
unequal, with women disproportionately gaining shares in technical and associate
professional activities at the top and in sales and service occupations at the bot-
tom.
3.4.3 Employment Polarization by Labour Market Area
Table 3.3 shows the grandmean, standard deviation and interquartile range for
TTWA's routine and manufacturing employment shares, the relative graduate and
immigrant population shares. The relative supply shares are taken as ratios with
respect to the non-graduate population in line with Autor and Dorn (2013).1.
As expected, on average the employment share in routine-intensive occupations
decreases over time, losing 7 percentage points in two decades. In parallel,
manufacturing employment loses 11 percentage points throughout the period. On
the contrary, the relative shares of graduates and immigrants increase over time.
In particular, GradSH increase substantially in both decades, more than doubling
between 1993 and 2013 (+0.32 pp). ImmSH registers an acceleration during the
2000s, due to higher inﬂows of both high and low skilled immigrants. Over the
two decades, the relative shares of high and low skilled immigrants increase by 4
and 5 percentage points respectively.
Figure 3.6 gives a visual idea of the geographical variation of these relevant
variables across TTWAs in the year 1993. Local labour markets that are more
intense in routine employment seem to be most concentrated in regions with
1I follow the literature [Bisello, 2014; Manacorda et al., 2012] in deﬁning as low-skilled
immigrants who left education before 21 years of age or that never had education, and viceversa
for high-skilled immigrants.
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higher manufacturing specialization, i.e. in the Midlands, Northern England and
in Wales. Graduate and immigrant relative labour supply shares are instead
more spread geographically, with high presence also in the Southern-East regions
which are typically more specialized towards professional, scientiﬁc and technical
activities.
Finally, ﬁgure 7 provides evidence of routine employment changes across UK
local labour markets in each decade. The top panels depict the start-of-the-
period routine employment share on the x-axis against the next period routine
employment share on the y-axis for each TTWA, while superimposing the 45
degree line. Both plots document that local routine employment shares have
not fallen everywhere but it is clear that the bulk of areas with initial routine
intensity above the grandmean (0.25) lie below the 45 degree line. The bottom
panels depict the ﬁtted line from an OLS regression of the change in the
routine employment share throughout the period (y-axis) on the start-of-the-
period routine employment share (x-axis). The estimates show a strong and
negative association. Although observations are weighted by the start of the
period TTWA's share of the national population, the downward slope may, at
this stage, be accentuated by measurement error. This will be addressed by the
instrumental variables strategy discussed in detail in the next section.
3.5 Estimation Strategy
In order to disentangle the causal eﬀect of technology exposure on the polarization
of employment I build on Autor and Dorn [2013] and adopt a spatial analysis
approach exploiting variation across UK local labour markets depending on their
intrinsic historical specialization in routine intensive occupations.
The RBTC hypothesis predicts the progressive substitution of technology for
labour in routine tasks. On the one hand, this force will raise the relative
demand for high-skill labour, who hold comparative advantage in performing non-
routine cognitive tasks. On the other hand, the marginal routine worker will
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reallocate to non-routine manual occupations under the assumption that their
relative comparative advantage is higher in low-skilled than high-skilled tasks. As
a consequence, local labour markets with initially higher specialization in routine-
intensive occupations should experience greater relative employment decline in
routine employment (1) while experience greater relative employment growth in
non-routine manual (2) and cognitive occupations (3). I test the routinization
hypothesis with the following regression model:
∆Yjt = α + β1RSHjt−1 +X ′jt−1β2 + γs + δt + jt (3.3)
Where ∆Yjt may represent the decadal change (1993-2003, 2003-2013) in the local
employment share of either (1) routine, (2) non-routine manual or (3) non-routine
cognitive occupations measured as described in section 3.3. The main regressor of
interest, RSH, is the local employment share in routine occupations. The vector
X includes a set of covariates controlling for potential shifts in the local supply and
demand. The set includes the local relative shares of graduates and immigrants,
measured as ratios to the non-graduate working-age population, and the local
initial share of manufacturing employment. The latter may proxy for other labour
demand shifts than technological change occurring in the manufacturing sector
such as the recent acceleration in the exposure to international import competition
since China's accession to the WTO. The speciﬁcation includes dummies for 11
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS1) to control for time-
invariant geographical unobserved heterogeneity1. The stacked regression also
includes dummies for each decade to account for aggregate changes over time.
Regressors in the main speciﬁcations are taken at their start-of-the-period levels
rather than as contemporaneous changes in order to avoid simultaneity bias.
However, estimates may be biased due to the presence of time-varying local speciﬁc
1The NUTS1 regions are: North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, East
Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South East, South West, Wales and
Scotland.
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unobservables, which might aﬀect both routine or non-routine employment and
our regressors of interest. To address this endogeneity issue I exploit 1971 Census
data and follow Autor and Dorn (2013) in using the historical local industry and
employment mix in order to instrument current routine employment share levels.
This generates an exogenous source of variation across TTWAs which will isolate
the long-run quasi-ﬁxed component of routine employment pre-determined by the
initial diﬀerences in industry specialization, from contemporaneous technological





Where Ei,j,1971 is the employment share in industry i in TTWA j in 1971, while
Ri,−j,1971 is the routine occupation employment share in industry i in all regions
except the one including TTWA j.
RSHIVj is based on the 1971 industrial structure, two decades before the sample
of analysis and around a decade before computer technology boomed across the
UK. This should lessen any endogeneity concerns arising from current economic
shocks aﬀecting routine employment. Furthermore, the use of census data for the
construction of the instrument allows to address any measurement error bias in
local routine employment.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Hollowing-out of Routine Employment
The ﬁrst outcome of interest is changes in routine employment. Table 4 com-
pares OLS and 2SLS results for the stacked and single period regressions. RSH
coeﬃcients appears smaller in the 2SLS analysis where endogeneity has been con-
trolled for by the instrument. While OLS results suggest a signiﬁcant negative
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eﬀect of technology exposure on both graduate and non-graduate wokers, 2SLS
estimates conﬁrm previous descriptive evidence depicting job polarization as a
non-graduate phenomenon. Recall that the Iqr for RSH in 1993 is 0.07. 2SLS
estimates in column 1 indicates that a TTWA with a routine employment share
at the 75th percentile in 1993 decreased the non-graduate routine employment
share on average by decade by around 3.3 percentage points more than a TTWA
at the 25th percentile. Single decade estimates in columns (2)-(3) reveal that the
magnitude of this eﬀect decreases over time but appears signiﬁcant only during
the 1990s. The RSH coeﬃcient for the second decade is in fact quite imprecisely
estimated and thus not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The 2SLS estimates in columns (1)-(3) suggest a signiﬁcant eﬀect of technological
exposure on total routine employment changes. However, the RSH coeﬃcients
in columns (4)-(6) lose their overall negative sign and do not appear statistically
signiﬁcant. The RSH coeﬃcients in columns (7)-(9) suggest instead a sizeable
technology-induced contraction in local non-graduate routine employment. In par-
ticular, the 2SLS RSH point estimate in column (4) indicates that the decadal
average Iqr diﬀerential eﬀect is of around 3 percentage points. Single decade esti-
mates in columns (5)-(6) reveal that the magnitude of this eﬀect seems to decrease
only marginally for non-graduate employment over time but again results signiﬁ-
cant only during the 1990s.
These estimates appear somewhat larger than what found by Autor and Dorn
[2013] for the US. Their OLS ﬁndings show a 1980-2005 decadal average negative
association of 1.8 percentage points higher for commuting zones starting at the
80th percentile of the routine employment distribution than those at 20th per-
centile.
The instrumental variable strategy I exploit is appropriate as long as the historical
local diﬀerences in industrial specialization have signiﬁcantly persisted over time.
The table reports the Kleibergen and Paap [2006] F-statistics from each of the
ﬁrst-stage regressions. The 1971 industrial structure is a signiﬁcant predictor of
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recent routine employment but naturally decreasing over time. The statistics' val-
ues for 1990s and 2000s are 47 and 18, both above the Staiger and Stock [1997]'s
rule of thumb threshold of 10.
In table 3.5 I further investigate the role of labour supply and demand shifters in
hollowing out non-graduate employment in middling occupations. In columns (1)-
(3) the speciﬁcations include the start-of-the-period relative local shares of grad-
uates and immigrants. GradSH appears only signiﬁcant in the stacked regression
speciﬁcation. Given an Iqr of 0.09, the point estimate for GradSH indicates that
the average diﬀerential negative association for TTWAs with initially higher stock
of human capital is of around 0.5 percentage points. Higher local initial immigrant
concentrations appear instead positively associated with employment changes in
non-graduate routine employment during the 1990s.
In columns (4)-(6) I condition on the initial share of manufacturing employ-
ment, which is highly correlated with the main variable of interest (ρ1993=0.58
and ρ2003=0.38). This makes the RSH coeﬃcient increase in magnitude in the
ﬁrst decade regression even though statistically non-signiﬁcant, while in the 2000s,
where the eﬀect of RSH is entirely captured by the manufacturing variable. Over-
all, these estimates provide a quite robust piece of evidence of technology-induced
polarization, mainly happening during the 1990s.
3.6.2 Reallocation to Non-routine Manual Employment
In the ALM model, workers' supply is driven by comparative advantage. Autor
and Dorn [2013] provide a framework in which the continuosly falling price of
technology induces low-skilled workers to reallocate from routine to non-routine
manual tasks, at the bottom of the employment distribution. Results from table
5 suggest the progressive displacement of non-graduate employment in routine
intensive occupations. In this section I investigate the employment changes at the
lower tail of the distribution, testing the reallocation of non-graduate workers in
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non-routine non-manual jobs.
Table 3.6 displays the estimates of the regression model for the employment
changes in non-graduate non-routine manual employment. The ﬁrst panel shows
the OLS results. Columns (1)-(3) enter the start-of-the-period local routine
employment share alone, while columns (4)-(6) control for the initial relative
labour supply shares of graduates and low-skilled immigrants. The inclusion of the
control variables decreases the magnitude of the RSH coeﬃcient. 2SLS estimates
do not substantially diﬀer from OLS ones. Looking at the most restrictive 2SLS
speciﬁcations, the Iqr diﬀerential eﬀect for RSH on local non-routine manual
employment across the two decades is about 1.5 percentage point. This estimate
is again slightly higher than in Autor and Dorn [2013]'s analysis. Their 2SLS
estimates suggest an average decadal eﬀect of 0.8 percentage points for the 80-20th
percentile diﬀerential of the routine employment specialization during 1980-2005.
found in Autor and Dorn [2013] for the employment growth in service occupations
alone in the US between 1980 and 2005.
When separating the analysis by decade, the reallocation eﬀect appears to get
stronger over time, from 1.5 percentage points in the 1990s to almost 2 percentage
points in the 2000s. Although, again the RSH coeﬃcient is poorly estimated and
turns not signiﬁcant in the second decade regression. The initial relative shares
of graduates and of low-skilled immigrants do not appear to play any role.
In the last columns (7)-(9) the speciﬁcations include the initial local share of
manufacturing. Estimates appear in line with previous ﬁndings in table 3.5.
Manufacturing concentration is in fact signiﬁcantly positively correlated with
employment changes in non-graduate non-routine manual employment in the last
decade.
Following the literature, in the next table 3.7 I explore alternative demand-based
hypotheses for the reallocation of workers to non-routine manual employment, i.e.,
the role of oﬀshoring and of demographic changes in the labour force.
I measure oﬀshorability with an index developed Blinder and Krueger [2013] and
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mapped by Goos et al. [2014] into ISCO88 2-digit occupational code1. I compute
the local oﬀshorable employment share following the same procedure as for the
local routine-employment share, i.e. the TTWA-level top employment third of the
Oﬀshorability Index. The variable grandmean is 0.27 and the Iqr is 0.06.
Among the demographic changes, the increasing graduate working share could
boost non-routine manual employment through either a substitution eﬀect or an
income eﬀect. Such hypotheses suggest that the employment of unskilled workers
is increasingly dependent on the physical proximity to skilled ones as the latter
have a high opportunity cost of time and are expected to be net buyers of time-
intensive services performed by the former. Consumption spillovers of high-skilled
workers substituting market for home services is proxied by changes in average
annual usual hours worked by graduates. Income eﬀects are proxied by changes
in the 90th percentile of weekly wages2. In addition, the increasing feminization
of the labour market and the ageing of the population could raise the demand for
in-house services [Autor and Dorn, 2013; Manning, 2004; Mazzolari and Ragusa,
2013].
Table 3.7 shows 2SLS estimates. The direction of the estimated associations
appear in line with Autor and Dorn [2013]. Columns (1)-(3) control the start-of-
the-period share of local oﬀshorable employment. The Offsh coeﬃcients suggest
quantitatively very small eﬀects and do not appear signiﬁcant. The RSH point
estimates barely change while turning not signiﬁcant, possibly because of the
very high correlation between the two measures (ρ1993=0.86 and ρ2003=0.84).
The negative point estimate for changes, GradHRS, shows evidence against
consumption spillovers while pointing towards a mere supply-side substitution
eﬀect. GradHRS is signiﬁcantly associated with non-routine manual employment
1Goos et al. [2014] adopt Blinder and Krueger [2013] preferred oﬀshorability measure. This
measure is based on professional coders' oﬀoshorability assessment of workers' description of
their job tasks in the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII) survey. The questions
in the survey to evaluate self-reported oﬀshorability regard the requirement of face-to-face or
physical presence at the job and whether the task could be performed at a remote location
without substantial quality deterioration.
2Results do not change if the 75th percentile is used instead.
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changes in both decades and increases in magnitude over time. Furthermore, there
is no evidence for income eﬀects. Finally, neither the change in the population
share of senior citizens (aged 65+) nor the change in the share of working women
show relevant contributions. The results conﬁrm the driving role of technological
exposure in fuelling employment growth at the bottom of the occupational skill
distribution.
3.6.3 Changes in Non-routine Cognitive Employment
The analysis has so far provided empirical evidence for non-graduate routine-
task work displacement and its subsequent reallocation to the bottom of the
employment distribution. A further emerging relevant factor is that changes in
graduate employment are signiﬁcantly negatively related to employment growth
in non-graduate bottom occupations and the association is growing over time.
I complete the picture by switching the focus to the upper tail of the
occupational distribution and investigate employment changes in non-routine
cognitive employment. The RBTC hypothesis predicts increases in the relative
demand for non-routine cognitive tasks, through a direct complementarity
between high-skilled workers and computer technologies. In this section I test
whether historically routine intensive areas have registered any employment
growth in high-skill (high-wage) occupations such as professional and managerial
ones.
Table 3.8 focuses therefore on graduate employment outcomes1. While the OLS
point estimates for RSH suggest signiﬁcant employment gains, this association is
wiped away when using the instrumental variables estimation. Furthermore, the
2SLS RSH point estimates decrease substantially when labour supply controls
are plugged-in. The absence of a technology-induced eﬀect may indicate that
the increase in the supply of high-skilled workers might have out-weighted the
demand for skills. This hypothesis is reinforced by the negative point estimate for
1The estimated results for non-graduate employment are non-signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the
essential reallocation of the marginal non-graduate routine worker to lower-skilled occupations.
94
the start-of-the-period local relative graduate labour supply share.
GradSH is signiﬁcantly negatively associated with top employment changes
during the 1990s, in coincidence with the rapid educational upgrading of the
labour force. The coeﬃcient for GradSH indicates that the Iqr diﬀerential for
initially more human capital-intensive areas is of about -2 percentage points.
Higher initial local high-skilled immigrants' relative labour supply is instead
strongly positively related to graduate employment changes at the top of the
distribution during each decade. The average decadal Iqr diﬀerential association
for HighImmSH is of about 4 percentage points. Single decade regressions show
that this eﬀect is higher during the 1990s. This is consistent with the outlined
policy context of the UK. Between the late 1990s and the enlargement of the
European Union, the government speciﬁcally supported high-skilled economic
immigration.
Finally, in the last three columns (7)-(9) I plug in the initial share of manufacturing
employment. This does not alter the main results. However, the initial share
of manufacturing employment appears signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with
changes in graduate non-routine cognitive employment during the 2000s. The
variable may capture the impact of exposure to international trade. The negative
association of ManufSH appears broadly in line with Bilici [2016]'s ﬁndings of
a detrimental eﬀect of China's import exposure on graduate employment during
the period 1998-2013.
3.6.4 Eﬀects on the Working-age Population and Robust-
ness Checks
The empirical evidence from the spatial analysis described above is valid as long
as the mobility responses to technological shocks of the local population are weak.
If technological change induces local workers to move in or out of localities, the
employment eﬀect of technology would disperse through the national economy.
This would undermine the ability to identify the direct eﬀect of technology within
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local labour markets. The dependent variable in table 3.9 denotes the change in
the log of the overall, graduate and non-graduate local working-age population.
2SLS estimates show that local initial routine intensity does not lead to any
signiﬁcant substantial change in the working age population. This conﬁrms the
adequacy of the empirical strategy.
In table 3.10 I check the sensitivity of technology exposure eﬀect when controlling
for contemporaneous labour supply changes. The table reports the OLS and 2SLS
RSH coeﬃcients for the routine, non-routine manual and non-routine cognitive
main speciﬁcations. The plug-in of contemporaneous labour supply changes does
not signiﬁcantly alter the interpretation of the main results.
Finally, as a robustness check with respect to the deﬁnition of routine intensity,
table 3.11 reports the estimated RSH coeﬃcients where the set of routine-
intensive occupations is extended to the top employment-weighted 40% of the
RTI index. The results do not relevantly diﬀer from the main analysis, although
show a more substantial relevance of labour supply changes in the polarization
of the employment distribution. Furthermore, the negative RSH coeﬃcient in
panel C conﬁrms that technological change does not appear to have contributed
to growth in non-routine cognitive employment.
3.7 Occupational Transitions
In this last section I complement the main analysis with the use of a 1% random
longitudinal census sample covering the period 1971-2011. This sample links
individuals' census records over their lifespan. The tracking of individuals'
job transitions allows to perform a ﬁner-level analysis on employment changes.
Furthermore, transitions are analysed decade by decade in a longer time span and
separately for graduates and non-graduates. This is speciﬁcally done with the
purpose to assess the contribution of the recent labour supply changes in shaping
the current employment structure. The mobility process can be depicted using a
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transition matrix, such that:
Occt = P ∗Occt−1 (3.5)
Where Occt−1 and Occt represent the vectors of the marginal occupational
distributions in periods t − 1 and t respectively. P is the m x m probability
matrix characterising the transition process by determining the probability that
an individual in occupation i at time t− 1 remains in the same job or transits to
another occupation j 6= i in next period.
Occupational concordance has been created following the same probabilistic
matching procedure used for the main sample of analysis as discussed in section
3.3. Such method assigns each individual A with a conditional probability wi,j
at each point in time for each occupational pair (i,j). With the simplifying
assumption of independence between occupational distributions over time, I
compute the transition probability entries of matrix P as following:







where, for each individual A, the ﬁrst component gives an estimate of the joint
probability to belong to the occupational transition pair (i, j) during the period
t−1 to t and the second component gives an estimate of the marginal probability
of being employed in occupation i at time t− 1.
Figure 3.8 compares the exit probabilities for each skill category of workers,
routine, non-routine manual and non-routine cognitive across each decade. The
whole matrices are available in the Appendix, table 3.13.
A number of changes in the occupational trends are registered since the 1990s,
in coincidence with the great expansion in the pool of graduates. Panel A plots
the exit probabilities for routine workers. Notably, during the 1990s graduates
see a substantial decrease in the probability to switch to the top (-13 percentage
points). At the same time they become gradually more likely to switch to the
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bottom, registering an overall change of +4 percentage points throughout the
whole period 1971-2011. Over time non-graduate workers become more likely to
move out of middle-paid jobs, both towards the top and the bottom. However,
while the former appears as a gradual phenomenon, the latter emerges since the
1990s. The probability to move to the bottom increases from a stable 12% during
1971-1991 to 17% in the 1990s and 21% in the 2000s.
Panel B shows the exit probabilities for top-paid workers. During the 1990s both
skill categories of workers become substantially more likely to move down the
occupational ladder towards either middle or bottom ranked jobs. Focusing on the
exit patterns from top to middle, the switching probability for graduate workers
increases by 7 percentage points in the 1990s, while stabilizes thereafter. The same
switching probability for non-graduate workers increases by 9 percentage points
during the 1990s and by further 4 percentage points during the 2000s. Therefore
a generalized occupational downgrading pattern appears, although quantitatively
aﬀecting non-graduates twice as much as graduates.
Finally, panel C shows the exit probabilities for non-routine manual workers.
The left hand side plot clearly shows a progressive decline in upward mobility
for graduate workers, which accentuates during the 1990s (-23 percentage
points). The general picture does not alter when the whole set of middle-ranked
occupations is considered instead of routine-intensive occupational groups only.
Results only partly comply with the literature ﬁndings for the US. Cortes (2016)
observes that, since 1990s, the probability of switching out of routine jobs to both
types of non-routine occupations increases, although more towards non-routine
cognitive ones. The empirical evidence emerging for the UK shows that non-
graduate workers become markedly more likely to move to bottom ranked jobs
after 1991, which is in line with the RBTC hypothesis. However, this is clearly
only part of the story, as the increase in the outﬂows from any occupational group
has increasingly concentrated towards the bottom of the distribution, showing a
generalized downgrading pattern. An important observation is that Cortes [2016]
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looks at two-year windows, while this analysis focuses on decadal transitions.
This makes the results of this paper quite robust. Longer time-windows allow for
stronger learning eﬀect which in general would work against ﬁnding occupational
downgrading patterns.
3.8 Conclusions
This paper advances the literature on employment polarization in the UK. The
main contribution is the identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of technological exposure on
the occupational structure. The empirical strategy builds on the spatial analysis
approach of Autor and Dorn [2013] and exploits geographical variation across local
labour markets stemming from their historical specialization in routine-intensive
activities to identify the causal eﬀect of technological exposure during the period
1993-2013. The study is complemented with longitudinal census data spanning
1971-2011 in order to provide a further test for the routinization phenomenon and
look at the evolution of the employment-skill distribution.
The econometric analysis shows that technological change has merely substituted
routine labour and caused a downward shift of the marginal less-skilled middle
workers. However, no eﬀect is found at the top of the employment distribution.
Additionally, there is some suggestive evidence on the long-run eﬀect of
demographic factors on employment changes. Areas starting with higher human
capital are signiﬁcantly associated with lower growth in graduate non-routine
cognitive employment during the 1990s. Initial local high-skilled immigrants'
concentrations are instead strongly positively associated with graduate non-
routine cognitive employment changes during each decade. At the bottom, the
initial local skill-mix does not show any relevant association. Contemporaneous
changes in the relative graduate labour supply shares are instead signiﬁcantly
negatively related to non-routine manual occupations and the magnitude of this
association is growing over time.
While the polarization phenomenon has been detected in the literature since at
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least the 1980s, the occupational transition analysis shows that the reallocation of
non-graduates to the bottom of the distribution accentuates during the 1990s, in
coincidence with the important changes in graduate labour supply. However,
the 1990s more strikingly mark a pronounced occupational downgrading of
graduate workers. This unveils the role of the educational upgrading as a
distinctive force of polarization. The disruptive technological change and the
intensifying job competition along the occupational ladder caused by educational
upgrading highlight the fundamental need for policy-makers to focus on sustaining
employment and promoting a more eﬃcient allocation of skills.
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Tables
Table 3.1: RTI classiﬁcation using the 1993 employment distribution (%)
Occupations Code RTI Level Cumulative Top 33%
Oﬃce clerks 41 2.24 15.08 15.08 x
Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers 73 1.59 1.25 16.33 x
Customer service clerks 42 1.41 3.37 19.70 x
Other craft and related trades workers 74 1.24 1.87 21.57 x
Machine operators and assemblers 82 0.49 5.49 27.06 x
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 72 0.46 7.489 34.55
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 0.45 2.84 37.39
Stationary plant and related operators 81 0.32 1.02 38.41
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 52 0.05 3.74 42.15
Sales and services elementary occupations 91 0.03 4.08 46.23
Extraction and building trade workers 71 -0.19 2.82 49.05
Life science and health associate professionals 32 -0.33 1.36 50.41
Physical, mathematical and engineering science associate professionals 31 -0.4 2.48 52.89
Other associate professionals 34 -0.44 5.07 57.96
Personal and protective service workers 51 -0.6 8.19 66.15
Other professionals 24 -0.73 3.84 69.99
Corporate managers 12 -0.75 8.97 78.96
Physical, mathematical and engineering science professionals 21 -0.82 4.71 83.67
Life science and health professionals 22 -1 3.34 87.01
Drivers and mobile plant operators 83 -1.5 4.77 91.78
General Managers 13 -1.52 8.23 100.01
Notes: The table contains the full list of 2-digit ISCO-88 occupations in the sample, ranked from high to low
values of the RTI index. The RTI index is the same used by Goos et al. [2014]. The levels and cumulative
employment shares of each occupation are shown for the year 1993. Following Autor and Dorn [2013], the
routine-intensive occupations are deﬁned as those belonging to the top employment-weighted 33% of the
RTI index.
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Table 3.2: Levels and changes in employment shares (%), 1993-2013
Level Delta
Occupations Code Log wage 1993 2003 2013 1993-2013 RTI
Top
PMES professionals1 21 2.78 4.71 5.44 6.37 1.66 -0.82
Corporate managers 12 2.76 8.97 9.73 11.62 2.65 -0.75
Other professionals 24 2.68 3.84 4.26 4.91 1.07 -0.73
Life, science and health professionals 22 2.66 3.34 3.84 4.7 1.36 -1
PMES associate professionals2 31 2.54 2.48 2.04 2.23 -0.25 -0.4
Other associate professionals 34 2.51 5.07 5.6 6.17 1.1 -0.44
General managers 13 2.48 8.23 8.16 8.6 0.37 -1.52
Middle
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 72 2.38 7.48 6.17 5.05 -2.43 0.46
Stationary plant and related operators 81 2.34 1.02 0.55 0.36 -0.66 0.32
Extraction and building trade workers 71 2.31 2.82 3.49 2.73 -0.09 -0.19
Life science and health professionals 32 2.31 1.36 1.5 2.24 0.87 -0.33
Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers 73 2.27 1.25 0.81 0.55 -0.69 1.59
Oﬃce clerks 41 2.21 15.08 14.74 12.44 -2.64 2.24
Drivers and mobile plant operators 83 2.15 4.77 5.08 4.07 -0.7 -1.5
Machine operators and assemblers 82 2.11 5.49 3.43 2.42 -3.07 0.49
Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport 93 2.02 2.84 2.5 2.16 -0.68 0.45
Customer service clerks 42 2.01 3.37 2.8 2.45 -0.92 1.41
Bottom
Personal and protective service workers 51 1.96 8.2 10.05 12.02 3.82 -0.6
Other craft and related trades workers 74 1.95 1.87 1 0.67 -1.2 1.24
Sales and services elementary occupations 91 1.88 4.08 4 3.75 -0.34 0.03
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 52 1.84 3.74 4.8 4.51 0.77 0.05
Notes: The table reports the levels and changes in the employment shares as well as the RTI index values by
2-digit ISCO-88 occupation. Occupations are ranked by median log hourly wages. Routine-intensive occupations
appear bold font. Average log hourly wages are computed across all the years in the period 1993-2013 and then
adjusted using the 2015 Consumer Price Index (CPI). The wage distribution for the period 1993-1996 is taken from
respondents at the ﬁth interview (instead of ﬁrst) because of data limitation.
1−2 PMES stands for Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science.
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics of Relevant Variables
1993 2003 2013
Mean S. D. Iqr Mean S. D. Iqr Mean S. D. Iqr
RSH 0.246 0.573 0.071 0.207 0.053 0.057 0.174 0.056 0.06
ManufSH 0.275 0.091 0.12 0.213 0.083 0.103 0.163 0.078 0.091
GradSH 0.237 0.075 0.093 0.35 0.115 0.143 0.563 0.339 0.267
ImmSH 0.042 0.031 0.037 0.055 0.04 0.042 0.096 0.06 0.069
HighImmSH 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.058 0.057 0.051
LowImmSH 0.039 0.029 0.036 0.045 0.035 0.042 0.081 0.057 0.069
Notes: The table shows the mean, standard deviation and interquartile
range values of relevant variables in the analysis for each year in the sample.
RSH is the TTWA employment share in routine-intensive; ManufSH
is the TTWA employment share in the manufacturing sector; GradSH
is the TTWA relative share of graduates as a ratio with respect to
the non-graduate population; ImmSH, HighImmSH and LowImmSH
are respectively the TTWA relative share of immigrants, high-skilled
immigrants and low-skilled immigrants, as ratios with respect to the non-
graduate population. High-skilled immigrants are deﬁned as having left
education at least at 21 years of age. Viceversa, low-skilled immigrants are
considered as those who left education before 21 years of age or that never
had education.
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Table 3.4: Changes in Routine Employment
All Graduate Non-graduate
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS
RSHj,t−1 -0.820*** -0.749*** -0.923*** -0.086** -0.063** -0.111*** -0.731*** -0.681*** -0.816***
(0.051) (0.052) (0.083) (0.020) (0.020) (0.040) (0.044) (0.051) (0.070)
R2 0.474 0.559 0.417 0.139 0.097 0.309 0.446 0.526 0.406
2SLS
RSHj,t−1 -0.465*** -0.519*** -0.347 0.021 -0.018 0.098 -0.488** -0.499** -0.454
(0.106) (0.108) (0.296) (0.041) (0.042) (0.118) (0.108) (0.106) (0.278)
1Stage
K-P F-stat 48.906 46.989 17.751 48.906 46.989 17.751 48.906 46.989 17.751
N 372 186 186 372 186 186 372 186 186
Notes: The dependent variables are changes in the routine employment share for all, graduate and non-
graduate workers. All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1) dummies. Period dummies are
included in the stacked regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by TTWA in the stacked
regressions, robust standard errors are used for single period regressions. Observations are weighted by
the start-of-the-period TTWA share of the national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level
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Table 3.5: Changes in Routine Employment
Non-graduate
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
OLS
RSHj,t−1 -0.785*** -0.720*** -0.926*** -0.825*** -0.778*** -0.961***
(0.046) (0.051) (0.067) (0.054) (0.061) (0.072)
GradSHj,t−1 -0.103*** -0.073* -0.151*** -0.095*** -0.069* -0.145***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.029) (0.024) (0.039) (0.028)
ImmSHj,t−1 0.037 0.180** 0.089 0.030 0.179** 0.096*
(0.054) (0.072) (0.060) (0.058) (0.071) (0.058)
ManufSHj,t−1 0.057*** 0.066* 0.057
(0.028) (0.035) (0.038)
R2 0.482 0.541 0.501 0.488 0.548 0.506
2SLS
RSHj,t−1 -0.443** -0.569** -0.242 -0.381** -0.575** -0.004
(0.105) (0.108) (0.388) (0.153) (0.186) (0.680)
GradSHj,t−1 -0.060** -0.037 -0.075 -0.062** -0.038 -0.067
(0.024) (0.044) (0.049) (0.023) (0.045) (0.061)
ImmSHj,t−1 -0.012 0.132* -0.067 -0.011 0.132* -0.120
(0.042) (0.072) (0.112) (0.039) (0.076) (0.170)
ManufSHj,t−1 -0.046 0.004 -0.104
(0.045) (0.066) (0.125)
1Stage
P-K test 54.135 60.437 10.859 26.335 25.872 4.783
N 372 186 186 372 186 186
Notes: The dependent variable is changes in the routine employment share
of non-graduate workers. All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1)
dummies. Period dummies are included in the stacked regressions. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by TTWA in the stacked regressions, robust
standard errors are used for single period regressions. Observations are weighted
by the start-of-the-period TTWA share of the national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant
at 10 percent level
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Table 3.6: Changes in Non-routine Manual Employment
Non-graduate
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
OLS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RSHj,t−1 0.210*** 0.224*** 0.258*** 0.205*** 0.235*** 0.248** 0.156*** 0.263*** 0.152
(0.046) (0.063) (0.097) (0.049) (0.066) (0.101) (0.052) (0.077) (0.093)
GradSHj,t−1 0.003 0.029 -0.003 0.011 0.028 0.017
(0.021) (0.043) (0.029) (0.021) (0.044) (0.031)
ImmSHj,t−1 0.071 0.035 0.044 0.066 0.036 0.062
(0.056) (0.102) (0.091) (0.055) (0.103) (0.095)
ManufSHj,t−1 0.070** -0.032 0.165***
(0.028) (0.042) (0.057)
R2 0.209 0.185 0.123 0.212 0.189 0.124 0.220 0.191 0.167
2SLS
RSHj,t−1 0.270*** 0.242** 0.332 0.210** 0.211** 0.282 0.081 0.254 -0.194
(0.081) (0.118) (0.287) (0.087) (0.106) (0.397) (0.134) (0.178) (0.586)
GradSHj,t−1 0.003 0.025 -0.000 0.005 0.027 -0.003
(0.023) (0.043) (0.046) (0.023) (0.043) (0.047)
ImmSHj,t−1 0.070 0.043 0.034 0.081 0.038 0.161
(0.059) (0.096) (0.145) (0.060) (0.099) (0.194)
ManufSHj,t−1 0.087* -0.029 0.222**
(0.045) (0.068) (0.111)
1Stage
P-K F-test 48.91 46.99 17.75 49.608 60.234 11.093 24.942 26.506 5.28
N 372 186 186 372 186 186 372 186 186
Notes: The dependent variable is changes in the non-routine manual employment share of non-graduate
workers. All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1) dummies. Period dummies are included in
the stacked regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by TTWA in the stacked regressions,
robust standard errors are used for single period regressions. Observations are weighted by the start-of-
the-period TTWA share of the national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level
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Table 3.7: Changes in Non-routine Manual Employment, 2SLS
Non-graduate
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
RSHj,t−1 0.279 0.331 0.299 0.289*** 0.254** 0.384 0.254*** 0.171 0.328 0.276*** 0.252** 0.365
(0.564) (0.584) (4.384) (0.079) (0.114) (0.296) (0.098) (0.144) (0.287) (0.081) (0.117) (0.302)
Offshj,t -0.008 -0.088 0.026
(0.457) (0.482) (3.230)
∆ GradHRSj,t -0.138*** -0.127** -0.221***
(0.048) (0.056) (0.055)
∆ Wage(p90)j,t -0.033** -0.027* -0.045**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.021)
∆ OldSHj,t -0.010 -0.211 -0.012
(0.086) (0.188) (0.086)
∆ FemaleSHRj,t 0.065 0.053 0.095
(0.047) (0.062) (0.066)
N 372 186 186 372 186 186 340 154 186 372 186 186
P-K F-test 2.931 4.594 0.145 48.77 47.761 17.51 35.066 26.694 17.991 45.916 46.801 15.499
Notes: The dependent variable is changes in the non-routine manual employment share of non-graduate workers.
The conditioning variables are: Offsh, the share of oﬀshorable employment; ∆ GradHRS, changes in the average
annual usual worked hours by graduates; ∆ Wage(p90), changes in the 90th percentile of weekly wages; ∆ OldSH,
changes in the share of the 65+ population; ∆ FemaleSHRj,t, changes in the employment share of women.
All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1) dummies. Period dummies are included in the stacked regressions.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by TTWA in the stacked regressions, robust standard errors are used
for single period regressions. Observations are weighted by the start-of-the-period TTWA share of the national
population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level
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Table 3.8: Changes in Non-routine Cognitive Employment
Graduate
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS
RSHj,t−1 0.175** 0.239*** 0.124 0.175** 0.185*** 0.110 0.225** 0.151* 0.249
(0.072) (0.071) (0.151) (0.072) (0.070) (0.158) (0.088) (0.091) (0.166)
GradSHj,t−1 -0.042 -0.193*** 0.019 -0.052 -0.190*** 0.004
(0.036) (0.065) (0.061) (0.036) (0.065) (0.060)
HighImmSHj,t−1 0.725*** 1.389*** 0.591* 0.747*** 1.384*** 0.474
(0.105) (0.415) (0.313) (0.110) (0.412) (0.304)
ManufSHj,t−1 -0.070 0.039 -0.225***
(0.045) (0.058) (0.066)
R2 0.288 0.127 0.262 0.352 0.191 0.306 0.356 0.193 0.341
2SLS
RSHj,t−1 0.194 0.089 0.416 0.056 0.030 0.091 0.115 -0.160 0.625
(0.152) (0.172) (0.392) (0.141) (0.156) (0.424) (0.204) (0.250) (0.616)
GradSHj,t−1 -0.054 -0.226*** 0.017 -0.058* -0.233*** 0.044
(0.035) (0.078) (0.068) (0.034) (0.079) (0.076)
HighImmSHj,t−1 0.742*** 1.475*** 0.602* 0.752*** 1.497*** 0.250
(0.100) (0.429) (0.353) (0.103) (0.422) (0.440)
ManufSHj,t−1 -0.044 0.136 -0.291**
(0.062) (0.089) (0.129)
1Stage
K-P F-test 48.906 49.989 17.751 62.915 67.458 16.341 32.516 28.45 8.825
N 372 186 186 372 186 186 372 186 186
Notes: The dependent variable is changes in the non-routine cognitive employment share
of graduate workers. All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1) dummies. Period
dummies are included in the stacked regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
by TTWA in the stacked regressions, robust standard errors are used for single period regressions.
Observations are weighted by the start-of-the-period TTWA share of the national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10 percent
level
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Table 3.9: Eﬀects on the Working-age Population, 2SLS
All Graduate Non-graduate
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RSHj,t−1 0.183** -0.019 0.597** 0.030 -0.408 0.891 0.080 -0.076 0.411
(0.081) (0.068) (0.291) (0.531) (0.741) (1.096) (0.227) (0.202) (0.591)
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
RSHj,t−1 0.102 -0.016 -0.016 -0.707 -0.491 0.387 0.789** 0.052 0.922
(0.072) (0.069) (0.069) (0.633) (0.642) (1.382) (0.358) (0.222) (0.859)
GradSHj,t−1 0.019 -0.004 -0.004 -1.017*** -1.650*** -0.458** 0.155 0.106 -0.020
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.159) (0.289) (0.180) (0.105) (0.091) (0.123)
ImmSHj,t−1 0.065** -0.004 -0.004 1.178*** 1.009** 0.462 -0.726** -0.260 -0.237
(0.027) (0.049) (0.049) (0.299) (0.463) (0.369) (0.29) (0.165) (0.258)
N 372 186 186 371 186 185 372 186 186
Notes: The dependent variables are changes in the log of the overall, graduate and
non-graduate population. Panel A shows RSH estimates for the univariate regression,
Panel B shows RSH estimates conditioning on the relative shares of graduates and
immigrants. All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1) dummies. Period
dummies are included in the stacked regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are
clustered by TTWA in the stacked regressions, robust standard errors are used for
single period regressions. Observations are weighted by the start-of-the-period TTWA
share of the national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, * Signiﬁcant at 10
percent level.
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Table 3.10: Conditioning on Local Labour Supply
Changes, 2SLS
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
Panel A. Non-graduate routine employment changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSHj,t−1 -0.488*** -0.499*** -0.454 -0.478*** -0.510*** -0.350
(0.108) (0.106) (0.278) (0.094) (0.102) (0.262)
∆ GradSHj,t−1 -0.064*** -0.121*** -0.060**
(0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
∆ ImmSHj,t−1 -0.006 0.065 -0.075
(0.042) (0.069) (0.049)
1Stage
P-K F-test 48.906 46.989 17.751 48.568 46.315 16.018
Panel B. Non-graduate non-routine manual employment changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSHj,t−1 0.270*** 0.242** 0.332 0.252*** 0.261** 0.317
(0.081) (0.118) (0.287) (0.082) (0.123) (0.290)
∆ GradSHj,t−1 -0.031** -0.044 -0.051***
(0.015) (0.033) (0.016)
∆ ImmSHj,t−1 0.070 -0.066 0.031
(0.069) (0.131) (0.079)
1Stage
P-K F-test 48.906 46.989 17.751 48.686 45.455 16.963
Panel C. Graduate non-routine cognitive employment changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSHj,t−1 0.194 0.089 0.416 0.182* 0.094 0.272
(0.152) (0.172) (0.392) (0.108) (0.127) (0.288)
∆ GradSHj,t−1 0.220*** 0.437*** 0.191***
(0.058) (0.038) (0.069)
∆ ImmSHj,t−1 -0.015 -0.343** 0.177
(0.153) (0.172) (0.148)
1Stage
P-K F-test 48.906 46.989 17.751 48.672 46.648 17.079
Notes: As a robustness check RSH is now measured extending the
set of routine-intensive occupations to the top employment-weighted
40% of the RTI index. All speciﬁcations include intercept, region
(Nuts-1) dummies. Period dummies are included in the stacked
regressions. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by TTWA
in the stacked regressions, robust standard errors are used for single
period regressions. Observations are weighted by the start-of-the-
period TTWA share of national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, *
Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Table 3.11: Robustness Check: Routine-intensity
Measure (Top 40% of RTI Measure), 2SLS
1993- 1993- 2003- 1993- 1993- 2003-
2013 2003 2013 2013 2003 2013
Panel A. Non-graduate routine employment changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSHj,t−1 -0.237* -0.322* -0.129 -0.150 -0.296 -0.049
(0.138) (0.177) (0.265) (0.151) (0.185) (0.313)
GradSHj,t−1 0.030 -0.041 0.029
(0.059) (0.103) (0.089)
ImmSHj,t−1 -0.143* -0.054 -0.090
(0.080) (0.120) (0.129)
1st Stage
K-P F-stat 40.990 24.354 30.424 58.246 34.968 28.300
Panel B. Non-graduate non-routine manual employment changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSHj,t−1 0.333*** 0.190 0.511*** 0.307*** 0.152 0.537
(0.070) -0.118 (0.159) (0.076) (0.114) (0.182)
GradSHj,t−1 0.065** 0.040 0.104*
(0.033) (0.063) (0.057)
LowImmSHj,t−1 0.063 0.086 0.008
(0.057) (0.095) (0.107)
1st Stage
K-P F-stat 40.990 24.354 30.424 57.457 35.739 30.158
Panel C. Graduate non-routine cognitive employment changes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RSHj,t−1 -0.145 -0.027 -0.295 -0.216 -0.046 -0.446
(0.135) -0.192 (0.271) (0.140) (0.168) (0.313)
GradSHj,t−1 -0.124** -0.253** -0.122
(0.049) (0.104) (0.097)
HighImmSHj,t−1 0.806*** 1.522*** 0.878***
(0.110) (0.451) (0.332)
1st Stage
K-P F-stat 40.990 24.354 30.424 61.975 39.755 28.885
Notes: All speciﬁcations include intercept, region (Nuts-1) dummies.
Period dummies are included in the stacked regression. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by TTWA in the stacked regression,
robust standard errors are used for single period regressions.
Observations are weighted by the start-of-the-period TTWA share
of national population.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1 percent level, ** Signiﬁcant at 5 percent level, *
Signiﬁcant at 10 percent level.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Demographic Groups' Working Shares (%) for Employees, 1979-2012
Source: Salvatori [2015] (Figure 1).
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the shares of individuals under 30 years of
age, immigrants and graduates among employees in the UK. The
shares are normalized with respect to their 1980 levels.
Figure 3.2: Changes in Employment Shares (%) by Deciles, 1993-2013
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the percentage changes in the employment
shares by deciles. Occupations are grouped into employment-
weighted deciles of the 1993 wage distribution.
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Figure 3.3: Changes in Major Occupational Groups' Employment Shares (%) by
Educational Qualiﬁcation, 1993-2013
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the percentage changes in the employment
shares by educational qualiﬁcations, ranked by average log hourly
wages. Graduate qualiﬁcations are indicated by "degree or higher",
non-graduate qualiﬁcations are distinguished into (ranked from high
to low) "gce" (general certiﬁcate of education), "gcse" (general
certiﬁcate of secondary education), "none".
Figure 3.4: Changes in Major Occupational Groups' Employment Shares (%) by
Immigration Status, 1993-2013
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the percentage changes in the employment
shares by immigration status, ranked by average log hourly wages.
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Figure 3.5: Changes in Major Occupational Groups' Employment Shares (%) by
Gender, 1993-2013
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the percentage changes in the employment
shares by gender, ranked by average hourly wages.
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Figure 3.6: Geographical Distribution of Routine Employment, Graduate and
Immigrant Labour Supply Shares (%) in 1993
Notes: The ﬁgure plots the choropleth maps of England and Wales
TTWAs for the 1993 percentage share levels of the following vari-
ables: Routine employment, Manufacturing employment, Gradu-
ate and immigrant relative labour supply (with respect to the non-
graduate population). Darker coloured TTWAs have higher concen-
tration levels.
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Figure 3.7: Changes in Routine Employment Share by TTWA, 1993-2013
e
Notes: The ﬁgure plots routine employment share levels and changes across TTWAs by
decade. The top panels depict the start-of-the-period routine employment share (x-axis)
against the next period routine employment share (y-axis), while superimposing the 45 degree
line. The bottom panels depicts the ﬁtted line from an OLS regression of the change in the
routine employment share throughout the period (y-axis) on the start-of-the-period routine
employment share (x-axis).
N=186 x period. Observations are weighted by the start-of-the-period TTWA share of
national population.
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Figure 3.8: Exit Occupational Probabilities (%), 1971-2011
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the exit probabilities for graduate
vs non-graduate workers in each decade for each occupational
group category, i.e. Routine (Panel A), Non-routine cognitive
(Panel B), Non-routine manual (Panel C).
In 1991 census, missing values cannot be distinguished from
no qualiﬁcations in the records for highest qualiﬁcation.
Non-graduate values are imputed for individuals that reported
having no degree or higher qualiﬁcations in 2001. However,
general results do not alter if all individuals with missing
values in 1991 are imputed as having no degree qualiﬁcations.
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Appendix
Table 3.12: Levels and Changes in Employment Shares (2-digit) by Sector, 1993-2013
Manufacturing Non-manufacturing
Level Delta Level Delta
Occupations Code 1993 2003 2013 1993-2013 1993 2003 2013 1993-2013
Top
PMES professionals1 21 9.14 10.25 11.57 2.43 8.92 9.61 11.63 2.71
Corporate managers 12 6.1 6.68 8.99 2.89 4.23 5.15 5.97 1.74
Other professionals 24 1.54 1.96 1.1 -0.44 4.64 4.79 5.49 0.85
Life, science and health professionals 22 0.33 0.6 0.62 0.29 4.39 4.59 5.32 0.93
PMES associate professionals2 31 2.8 2.55 3.25 0.45 2.36 1.92 2.07 -0.29
Other associate professionals 34 3.99 4.43 4.41 0.42 5.45 5.86 6.43 0.98
General managers 13 6.73 8.61 8.95 2.22 8.75 8.05 8.55 -0.2
Middle
Metal, machinery and related trades workers 72 14.25 15.01 15.41 1.16 5.13 4.14 3.47 -1.66
Stationary plant and related operators 81 2.96 2.42 1.88 -1.08 0.33 0.12 0.13 -0.2
Extraction and building trade workers 71 2.07 3.04 3.13 1.06 3.08 3.59 2.67 -0.41
Life science and health professionals 32 0.07 0.11 0.4 0.33 1.81 1.82 2.52 0.71
Precision, handicraft, printing and related trades workers 73 3.9 3.42 2.6 -1.3 0.32 0.22 0.24 -0.08
Oﬃce clerks 41 10.79 9.77 9.58 -1.21 16.56 15.89 12.88 -3.68
Drivers and mobile plant operators 83 3.51 3.99 3.62 0.11 5.2 5.32 4.13 -1.07
Machine operators and assemblers 82 18.69 15.51 13.64 -5.05 0.89 0.65 0.7 -0.19
Labourers in MCMT3 93 4.77 5.08 5.33 0.56 2.15 1.9 1.67 -0.48
Customer service clerks 42 0.63 0.56 0.46 -0.17 4.32 3.32 2.76 -1.56
Bottom
Personal and protective service workers 51 0.68 0.58 0.7 0.02 10.82 12.23 13.75 2.93
Other craft and related trades workers 74 5.48 3.59 2.48 -3 0.62 0.41 0.39 -0.23
Sales and services elementary occupations 91 1.27 1.24 1.12 -0.15 5.06 4.64 4.15 -0.91
Models, salespersons and demonstrators 52 0.3 0.6 0.76 0.46 4.94 5.76 5.08 0.14
Notes: The table reports the levels and changes in employment shares by 2-digit ISCO-88 occupation, distinguishing
between manufacturing/non-manufacturing sector. Occupations are ranked by median log hourly wages. Average
log hourly wages are computed across all the years in the period 1993-2013 and then adjusted using the 2015
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The wage distribution for the period 1993-1996 is taken from respondents at the ﬁth
interview (instead of ﬁrst) because of data limitation.
1−2 PMES stands for Physical, Mathematical and Engineering Science.
3 MCMT stands for Mining, Construction, Manufacturing and Transport.
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Table 3.13: Occupational Transitions (%), 1971-2011
Panel A. 1971-1981 Panel C. 1991-2001
NRC R NRM NRC R NRM
NRC 96.2 3.4 0.4 NRC 88.9 8.4 2.8
Graduate R 68.8 27.7 3.6 Graduate R 57.6 35.7 6.7
NRM 77.9 9.5 12.6 NRM 48 14.9 37.1
N=3985 N=12485
NRC R NRM NRC R NRM
NRC 78.3 13.6 8.1 NRC 66.3 18.7 14.9
Non- R 18.8 69.4 11.8 Non- R 24.1 59 16.9
graduate NRM 17.3 18.6 64.1 graduate NRM 18.7 16.7 64.6
N=82567 N=116288
Panel B. 1981-1991 Panel D. 2001-2011
NRC R NRM NRC R NRM
NRC 96 3.4 0.6 NRC 86.9 8.8 4.4
Graduate R 70.6 25.1 4.2 Graduate R 61.6 29.7 7.7
NRM 71.2 14.9 13.9 NRM 50.6 13.2 36.3
N=6964 N=41692
NRC R NRM NRC R NRM
NRC 81.2 11 7.8 NRC 58.3 22 19.8
Non- R 21.1 67.2 11.7 Non- R 25.3 53.9 20.9
graduate NRM 18.4 17.2 64.4 graduate NRM 20.9 15.4 63.8
N=76819 N=130178
Notes: Each panel reports the decade-speciﬁc transition probabilities between any
occupational group (non-routine cognitive (NRC), routine (R), non-routine manual (NRM))
pair for graduate and non-graduate employees.
In 1991 census data, missing values cannot be distinguished from no qualiﬁcations in the
records for highest qualiﬁcation. Non-graduate values are imputed for individuals that
reported having no degree or higher qualiﬁcations in 2001. However, general results do
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